CVE-2026-57126 in PraisonAI
Summary
by MITRE • 09/14/2026
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to praisonaiagents 1.6.58, SpiderTools._validate_url calls _host_is_blocked, which checks literal host encodings but does not resolve DNS names before scrape_page, crawl, extract_links, extract_text, or URL-mention fetches connect. An attacker-controlled hostname resolving to a loopback, private, link-local, or cloud-metadata address therefore bypasses the SSRF policy without a rebinding race and can expose internal responses to the agent. This issue is fixed in praisonaiagents 1.6.58.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/14/2026
The vulnerability identified within PraisonAI prior to version 1.6.58 represents a critical Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) flaw rooted in insufficient input validation and DNS resolution logic. PraisonAI operates as a multi-agent system where various tools interact with external resources, including web scraping and data extraction functionalities. The core of the vulnerability lies within the SpiderTools component, specifically in the _validate_url method which delegates host verification to the _host_is_blocked function. This function was designed to enforce security policies by checking if a requested hostname is blocked or restricted based on predefined criteria intended to prevent access to internal network resources. However, the implementation contained a fundamental logical error: it performed checks against literal string encodings of the hostname without resolving those names into their corresponding IP addresses prior to initiating network connections.
This architectural oversight allows an attacker-controlled hostname that resolves via DNS to a loopback address such as 127.0.0.1, a private internal range like 192.168.x.x or 10.x.x.x, a link-local address, or even cloud metadata endpoints typically found at addresses like 169.254.169.254 to bypass the SSRF policy entirely. Because the validation occurs before DNS resolution and connection establishment, the security check sees only the domain name string rather than the actual destination IP address. Consequently, when functions such as scrape_page, crawl, extract_links, or extract_text are invoked with a maliciously crafted URL, the system proceeds to connect to the resolved internal address without triggering any blocks. This bypass mechanism does not require complex race conditions or rebinding attacks, making it straightforward for an attacker to exploit and reliably access sensitive internal services from within the agent environment.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe as it enables unauthorized access to internal network resources that should be isolated from external agents. An adversary could leverage this flaw to probe internal infrastructure, exfiltrate data from local databases or APIs, or interact with cloud metadata services to steal instance credentials and configuration details. This exposure compromises the confidentiality and integrity of the underlying system architecture by allowing an agent operating under potentially untrusted inputs to reach destinations that are strictly prohibited by security policies. The ability to access loopback interfaces also facilitates attacks against localhost-only services such as local databases, administrative panels, or debugging tools that do not expose themselves to external networks but remain accessible via internal routing.
To mitigate this vulnerability and prevent similar SSRF issues in the future, it is imperative to implement robust DNS resolution checks before validating hostnames. Security controls must resolve all provided URLs to their IP addresses first and then verify whether those resolved IPs fall within blocked ranges such as private, loopback, or link-local address spaces. This approach ensures that domain name spoofing cannot be used to bypass network-level restrictions. Additionally, organizations should enforce strict allow-lists for outbound connections where possible, restrict agent permissions to only necessary endpoints, and regularly update PraisonAI components to version 1.6.58 or later which addresses this specific logic flaw. Aligning these practices with industry standards such as CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) and MITRE ATT&CK technique T1046 Network Service Discovery can further strengthen the security posture against internal network reconnaissance and unauthorized data access attempts.