CVE-2026-58930 in Android
Summary
by MITRE • 11/02/2026
An unprivileged application can exploit a lack of package/signature validation in SystemUI's `RemoteQCController` when resolving a hardcoded `content://` URI. This allows the attacker to squat on a specific authority if the legitimate package is absent, inject spoofed UI elements into the trusted SystemUI Quick Controls panel, and gain a Background Activity Launch (BAL) grant from SystemUI when the user interacts with the spoofed element.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/02/2026
The vulnerability centers on a critical failure in input validation within the Android SystemUI component, specifically affecting the RemoteQCController class responsible for managing remote quick control operations. The core technical flaw lies in the application's handling of hardcoded content URIs during package resolution processes. When resolving these specific URI authorities, the system fails to perform adequate signature or package verification checks against the installed applications on the device. This oversight creates a security gap where the integrity of the component requesting data from the specified authority is not guaranteed by cryptographic means or strict identity validation. Consequently, any application running with unprivileged permissions can exploit this lack of verification to manipulate how SystemUI interprets and renders UI elements associated with that URI authority.
This architectural weakness enables an attacker to perform a technique known as content provider squatting. By registering a malicious package under the same authority string used by the legitimate system component, the attacker effectively hijacks the intent resolution process if the genuine application is not present or fails to claim priority correctly. Once this squatted authority is established, the malicious application can inject spoofed user interface elements directly into the trusted SystemUI Quick Controls panel. These injected elements appear as native parts of the operating system's control center, leveraging the high level of trust users and security mechanisms place in the SystemUI environment. The visual fidelity of these spoofed elements makes them indistinguishable from legitimate controls to an unsuspecting user.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to its ability to facilitate privilege escalation through social engineering combined with system-level grants. When a user interacts with one of these spoofed UI elements, believing it to be a standard quick setting toggle or button, SystemUI processes the interaction as if it were from an authorized source. This action triggers the granting of Background Activity Launch permissions to the malicious application holding the squatted authority. The BAL grant allows the attacker's app to launch activities in the background without explicit user consent for each subsequent operation, effectively bypassing standard Android security boundaries that restrict such behavior for unprivileged apps. This capability can be leveraged to execute further attacks, maintain persistence on the device, or exfiltrate data silently while appearing as normal system activity.
From a classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-284 Improper Access Control and CWE-798 Use of Hard-coded Credentials if the URI authority is considered a static security token that should be validated against known good sources rather than just resolved dynamically. In terms of offensive tactics, it maps to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1053 Scheduled Task/Job which relates to persistence mechanisms enabled by background execution rights, and potentially T1204 User Execution if the initial trigger requires user interaction with the spoofed UI element. The attack vector is local but relies on a trusted interface component being deceived into granting elevated privileges, highlighting the risk of trusting system-level components without rigorous input validation.
Mitigation strategies must focus on strengthening the package resolution logic within SystemUI to ensure that only applications signed with specific, verified certificates or belonging to whitelisted packages can claim authority over sensitive content URIs. Implementing strict signature verification during intent resolution for hardcoded authorities is essential to prevent squatting attacks. Additionally, restricting Background Activity Launch grants to explicitly allow-listed system components rather than granting them based on UI interaction alone would mitigate the impact of such spoofing attempts. Developers should also consider implementing digital signatures for intents or using explicit component names instead of implicit resolutions where possible to reduce ambiguity in package selection. Regular security audits focusing on content provider authorities and their associated permissions are recommended to identify similar validation gaps across other system components.