CVE-2026-59080 in Edito
Summary
by MITRE • 11/13/2026
Edito CMS sends JWT token via GET requests. This allows a local attacker with access to browser history to obtain valid JWT token and perform action on behalf of the victim. The token is valid for only short period of time; after that time, it expires and can no longer be used.
The vendor assessed the likelihood of exploitation as very low and determined that a fix is not necessary.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/13/2026
Edito CMS contains an authentication flaw where JSON Web Tokens are transmitted via HTTP GET requests rather than more secure methods such as POST headers or cookies with appropriate security flags. This architectural decision exposes sensitive session credentials to several vectors of leakage, primarily through browser history logs, server access logs, and proxy caches. When a token is included in the URL query parameters, it becomes visible to any entity capable of reading these records. For an attacker who has gained local access to a victim's machine or browser environment, this presents a straightforward path to credential theft without requiring complex exploitation techniques.
The core technical vulnerability lies in the improper handling and transmission of authentication credentials. By embedding the JWT in the URL, the system violates best practices for protecting sensitive data during transit within client-side applications. Browser history stores URLs including their query strings, meaning that any user with physical or remote access to the victim's device can inspect past requests and extract valid tokens. This is particularly dangerous because JWTs often contain claims that identify the user and grant specific permissions, effectively acting as a passkey for the application until expiration.
The operational impact of this vulnerability centers on unauthorized account takeover through session hijacking. Although the vendor has assessed the likelihood of exploitation as very low due to the short validity period of the tokens, the risk remains significant in environments where local access is possible or shared devices are used. An attacker could capture a token from browser history and use it to perform actions on behalf of the victim within that brief window. This undermines the confidentiality and integrity of user sessions, potentially leading to data exposure or unauthorized modifications depending on the privileges associated with the stolen token.
From a standards perspective, this issue aligns with CWE-200: Information Exposure and CWE-598: Use of GET Request Method To Send Sensitive Information. It also relates to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1539: Steal Web Session Cookie, although in this case the mechanism is token theft via URL rather than cookie extraction. The vulnerability highlights a common misconfiguration where convenience or legacy implementation choices override security requirements for credential protection.
To mitigate this risk, it is recommended that Edito CMS be updated to transmit JWTs using HTTP headers such as Authorization: Bearer <token> instead of query parameters. This ensures the token is not logged in browser history or server access logs by default. Additionally, implementing strict Content Security Policy directives and ensuring tokens are short-lived with refresh mechanisms can further reduce the window of opportunity for attackers. If updating is not immediately feasible, restricting URL length limits and sanitizing log outputs may provide partial relief, though header-based transmission remains the definitive solution.