CVE-2026-5923 in Poly CCX
Summary
by MITRE • 07/09/2026
Malicious use of a stolen cookie might allow modifications to the contents of the IP phone’s webpage.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 07/09/2026
This vulnerability represents a critical session management flaw that enables unauthorized modification of IP phone web interfaces through the exploitation of stolen authentication tokens. The issue stems from inadequate session validation mechanisms within the IP phone's web server implementation, where session cookies are not properly secured or validated against potential tampering attempts. When an attacker successfully steals a valid session cookie through methods such as network sniffing, cross-site scripting attacks, or credential theft, they can leverage this stolen token to access and modify the IP phone's administrative web interface without proper authentication. The technical flaw lies in the absence of robust session integrity checks and the lack of binding between session tokens and client characteristics such as IP addresses, user agents, or other contextual factors that would help detect unauthorized usage. This vulnerability directly maps to CWE-384, which addresses session management flaws where applications fail to properly validate session identifiers, and aligns with ATT&CK technique T1566 for credential harvesting and T1071 for application layer protocol usage. The operational impact extends beyond simple unauthorized access as attackers can modify phone configurations, alter call routing, change user permissions, or even disable critical communication functions that could disrupt business operations or create security breaches within corporate networks.
The exploitation of this vulnerability demonstrates a fundamental weakness in the IP phone's authentication architecture where session tokens are treated as sufficient authorization credentials without additional contextual validation. Modern web applications typically implement multi-factor session validation mechanisms including token binding, IP address correlation, and user agent verification to prevent such attacks. However, many IP phone implementations rely solely on cookie-based sessions without these additional security layers, making them susceptible to session hijacking attacks. The stolen cookie essentially provides attackers with a valid authentication context that bypasses standard access controls, allowing modification of web page contents through administrative interfaces that should normally require explicit authentication and authorization. This creates a significant risk for enterprise environments where IP phones serve as critical communication infrastructure components, potentially enabling attackers to perform actions such as modifying SIP configurations, changing phone numbers, altering voicemail settings, or even redirecting calls to malicious destinations.
Organizations should implement comprehensive session management strategies to mitigate this vulnerability by deploying secure cookie attributes including HttpOnly, Secure, and SameSite flags to prevent cookie theft through cross-site scripting attacks. The implementation of additional authentication factors such as multi-factor authentication, IP address binding for sessions, and periodic re-authentication requirements would significantly reduce the attack surface. Network segmentation and monitoring solutions should be deployed to detect unusual session activity patterns that might indicate stolen cookie usage. Regular security assessments should include testing for proper session management implementation, including validation of cookie attributes and session timeout mechanisms. According to NIST SP 800-63B guidelines for digital identity management, session tokens should be treated as sensitive credentials requiring robust protection measures similar to those applied to primary authentication factors. The vulnerability also highlights the need for secure coding practices in embedded web applications where developers often overlook proper session management implementation due to resource constraints or lack of security awareness. Organizations must ensure that IP phone firmware updates are regularly applied to address known session management vulnerabilities and that network administrators implement monitoring solutions capable of detecting unauthorized access attempts through stolen session tokens.