CVE-2026-62185 in argo-helm
Summary
by MITRE • 07/14/2026
Argo CD Helm Chart before 10.0.0 fails to install network policies by default, allowing any pod on a cluster to access repo-server and other Argo APIs. Attackers can exploit this unrestricted network access through combined attacks to achieve cluster compromise and remote code execution.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 07/14/2026
The vulnerability in Argo CD Helm Chart versions prior to 10.0.0 represents a critical network policy misconfiguration that fundamentally undermines cluster security boundaries. This flaw stems from the default installation process failing to implement proper network isolation controls, specifically neglecting to enforce network policies that would restrict communication between pods within the cluster. The absence of these protective measures creates an environment where any pod, regardless of its role or security posture, can establish connections to critical Argo CD components including the repo-server and other API endpoints. This architectural weakness directly violates principles of least privilege and network segmentation that are fundamental to secure containerized environments.
The technical implementation flaw manifests in the Helm chart's default configuration which does not include network policy definitions within its deployment manifests. Network policies in kubernetes serve as essential ingress and egress control mechanisms that define which pods can communicate with each other based on labels, namespaces, and port specifications. Without these policies in place, the Argo CD components operate in an open communication model where all cluster traffic is permitted to reach sensitive backend services. This design decision creates a pathway for attackers to leverage existing cluster connectivity to reach critical infrastructure components that should only be accessible by specific trusted services.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends far beyond simple network access issues and represents a significant escalation path for attackers seeking to compromise entire clusters. The unrestricted network access allows adversaries to perform reconnaissance activities against repo-server components, potentially extracting sensitive configuration data, deployment manifests, or access credentials stored within the Argo CD environment. More critically, this vulnerability enables attackers to conduct combined attack vectors that can lead to full cluster compromise and remote code execution capabilities. Attackers can leverage the open network paths to pivot from initial access points through the cluster to reach other critical systems and services, effectively transforming a single compromised pod into a gateway for broader cluster infiltration.
This vulnerability aligns with multiple CWE categories including CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) and CWE-310 (Cryptographic Issues), as it represents a failure in implementing proper access controls that should restrict network communication to authorized components only. From an ATT&CK framework perspective, this weakness maps directly to techniques such as T1046 (Network Service Scanning) for reconnaissance activities and T1059 (Command and Scripting Interpreter) for executing malicious code through compromised services. The vulnerability also demonstrates characteristics of T1210 (Exploitation of Remote Services) as attackers can exploit the exposed network endpoints to achieve their objectives without requiring additional attack vectors.
Organizations should implement immediate mitigations including upgrading to Argo CD Helm Chart version 10.0.0 or later where proper network policies are enabled by default, or manually configuring network policies to restrict access to critical components based on specific service requirements. The recommended approach involves creating ingress and egress policies that only permit communication from trusted pods such as the argocd-server and other legitimate clients while blocking all other traffic to repo-server and API endpoints. Additionally, security teams should conduct comprehensive network policy reviews across their entire cluster to ensure similar misconfigurations do not exist in other deployed applications and services.