CVE-2026-62253 in Homer
Summary
by MITRE • 10/07/2026
Homer is open source telecom observability software. Prior to version 11.0.283, both JWT middleware functions (`JWTMiddleware` and `JWTMiddlewareV4`) immediately return `next(c)` when `jwtSecret == ""`. The JWT secret defaults to an empty string. On a default installation, all protected API endpoints under `/api/v1`, `/api/v3`, and `/api/v4` are completely unauthenticated. Version 11.0.283 patches the issue.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/07/2026
Homer is an open-source telecom observability software designed to provide visibility into network performance and status through a unified dashboard interface. The vulnerability identified in versions prior to 11.0.283 represents a critical authentication bypass resulting from improper validation of configuration parameters within the JSON Web Token middleware implementation. Specifically, both JWTMiddleware and JWTMiddlewareV4 functions contain logic that immediately invokes next(c) when the jwtSecret variable is found to be an empty string. This conditional check fails to enforce mandatory authentication requirements when no secret key has been explicitly configured by the administrator.
The root cause of this flaw lies in the default configuration behavior of the software. By design, the JWT secret defaults to an empty string if not manually overridden during installation or deployment. Consequently, on any standard out-of-the-box setup where users do not modify the default settings, the authentication middleware effectively becomes a no-op for protected endpoints. This means that the security control intended to verify token validity and user identity is entirely disabled by default, leaving the application in an unauthenticated state without requiring any specific exploitation technique or external input beyond accessing the API directly.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to its scope and accessibility. All protected Application Programming Interface endpoints located under the /api/v1, /api/v3, and /api/v4 paths are completely exposed to unauthorized access. These endpoints typically handle sensitive operations such as retrieving network metrics, modifying system configurations, or accessing user-specific data within the telecom observability platform. An unauthenticated attacker can interact with these APIs directly using standard HTTP requests, potentially leading to full compromise of the application's integrity and confidentiality. This includes the ability to read confidential operational data, alter critical settings affecting network monitoring capabilities, or perform actions that could disrupt service availability for downstream consumers relying on accurate telemetry data.
From a classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-287 Improper Authentication, as the system fails to correctly verify credentials before granting access to restricted resources. It also maps to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078 Valid Accounts if an attacker were to leverage existing valid tokens obtained through other means, but more accurately reflects T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application given that it targets a web-facing service with default insecure configurations. The lack of enforced authentication constitutes a fundamental failure in the principle of least privilege and secure defaults, which are core tenets of modern application security frameworks such as OWASP Top 10 under category A07:2021 Identification and Authentication Failures.
Mitigation strategies must prioritize immediate remediation for all deployed instances running versions earlier than 11.0.283. The primary solution is to upgrade the Homer software package to version 11.0.283 or later, where the developers have patched this logic flaw by ensuring that authentication checks are enforced regardless of whether a custom secret has been provided. For environments unable to patch immediately due to operational constraints, administrators should manually configure a strong, non-empty JWT secret in the application configuration files before exposing any API endpoints to untrusted networks. Additionally, network-level controls such as firewall rules or reverse proxy configurations can be implemented to restrict access to these specific API paths only from trusted internal subnets until the patch is applied. Regular security audits and automated vulnerability scanning should also be employed to detect similar misconfigurations in other components of the telecom observability stack.