CVE-2026-6251 in Pro Plugin
Summary
by MITRE • 07/28/2026
The Chaty Pro plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authenticated Time-Based Blind SQL Injection in versions up to and including 3.5.5. This is due to the fetch_custom_field() function in admin/class-admin-base.php retrieving the widget_id POST parameter via filter_input(INPUT_POST, ...) and directly concatenating the value into a raw SQL query in a numeric context without using $wpdb->prepare() or any integer casting. Additionally, the nonce verification check is performed after the SQL query has already executed, providing no protection against the injection. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with subscriber-level access and above to inject arbitrary SQL commands, potentially leading to unauthorized extraction of sensitive database contents including user credentials and configuration data.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 07/28/2026
The Chaty Pro plugin for WordPress presents a critical security vulnerability classified as authenticated time-based blind sql injection affecting versions up to and including 3.5.5. This flaw resides within the fetch_custom_field() function located in admin/class-admin-base.php, where the plugin processes widget_id parameters submitted through post requests. The vulnerability stems from improper input sanitization practices that directly concatenate user-supplied data into sql queries without adequate protection mechanisms. The affected code utilizes filter_input(INPUT_POST, ...) to retrieve the widget_id parameter and subsequently incorporates this value into a raw sql query execution context, creating an exploitable condition that violates fundamental secure coding principles.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability demonstrates a classic sql injection vector through improper parameter handling and inadequate input validation. When an authenticated user submits a malicious widget_id value, the plugin fails to employ $wpdb->prepare() for sql query preparation or implement integer casting for numeric context validation. This omission allows attackers to manipulate the sql execution flow by injecting time-based sql payloads that cause deliberate delays in database response times. The vulnerability operates within a numeric context where the application expects integer values but receives malicious sql fragments that can be executed as part of the sql statement, enabling attackers to extract information through timing attacks.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple data extraction to encompass complete database compromise scenarios. Attackers with subscriber-level access or higher can leverage this flaw to execute arbitrary sql commands against the wordpress database instance, potentially gaining access to sensitive user credentials, configuration settings, and other confidential data stored within the system. The time-based blind nature of the injection makes detection more challenging as it operates through response timing variations rather than direct output reflection, allowing attackers to systematically extract data through iterative probing techniques. This vulnerability essentially provides a backdoor for authenticated attackers to perform unauthorized database operations while maintaining operational stealth.
The security implications align with common attack patterns documented in the attack technique framework, specifically relating to sql injection vulnerabilities categorized under attack technique 0x0001 for command execution and data extraction. From a weakness classification perspective, this vulnerability maps directly to cwe-89 which represents improper neutralization of special elements used in an sql command. The timing-based nature of the exploit also demonstrates characteristics consistent with advanced persistent threat patterns where attackers seek to establish long-term access through stealthy reconnaissance and data exfiltration methods. The vulnerability's exploitation requires minimal privileges but provides maximum impact, making it particularly attractive for attackers seeking to escalate their access within wordpress installations.
Mitigation strategies should focus on implementing proper input validation and parameterized queries throughout the plugin codebase. The primary fix involves replacing direct sql concatenation with $wpdb->prepare() method calls that properly sanitize all user inputs before query execution. Additionally, the nonce verification mechanism should be repositioned to occur before any sql operations, ensuring that all requests undergo proper authentication checks prior to database interaction. Security hardening measures include implementing proper access controls and privilege separation, ensuring that administrative functions require appropriate authorization levels before execution. Regular security audits of plugin code should verify compliance with secure coding standards and prevent similar vulnerabilities from emerging in future releases through proactive defensive programming practices.