CVE-2026-63149 in Agora
Summary
by MITRE • 10/15/2026
Omnispace Agora Project before 26.10.0 contains an insecure randomness vulnerability that allows attackers to predict temporary or default account passwords generated by Txt::defaultPassword() using PHP's uniqid() function based on server time in microseconds. Attackers who observe or approximate the account creation time can compute the predictable password and take over the account before the legitimate user logs in.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/15/2026
The vulnerability identified within Omnispace Agora Project versions prior to 26.10.0 represents a critical failure in cryptographic randomness, specifically classified under CWE-338: Use of PRNG Instead of a CSPRNG. The core technical flaw resides in the Txt::defaultPassword() function, which relies on PHP's uniqid() function to generate temporary or default account passwords during user registration processes. This implementation is fundamentally insecure because uniqid() generates identifiers based primarily on the current time in microseconds and an optional prefix. While this method provides sufficient uniqueness for non-security-critical tasks such as generating unique file names or session IDs, it lacks the entropy required for security-sensitive applications like password generation. The output of uniqid() is deterministic given a specific timestamp, meaning that if an attacker can determine or approximate the exact moment an account was created, they can reproduce the sequence used to generate the default password.
The operational impact of this vulnerability allows attackers to perform unauthorized access by predicting credentials before the legitimate user has had the opportunity to log in and change them. In typical registration flows, a system generates a temporary password, sends it via email or SMS, and expects the user to set a permanent one upon first login. If an attacker monitors network traffic, observes account creation events, or simply knows the approximate time of registration due to public visibility of new accounts, they can calculate the server's microsecond timestamp at that moment. By feeding this estimated timestamp into the same uniqid() logic used by the application, the attacker derives the exact temporary password assigned to the victim. This enables immediate account takeover, bypassing authentication controls entirely and granting the attacker full privileges associated with the newly created account before the legitimate owner can intervene.
This type of vulnerability aligns closely with MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078: Valid Accounts, where adversaries use valid credentials obtained through prediction or theft to maintain persistence and access sensitive resources. The predictability introduced by using a time-based pseudo-random number generator instead of a cryptographically secure one undermines the fundamental security principle that secrets must be unpredictable. Even with minor variations in timing estimates, the small entropy pool of uniqid() often allows attackers to brute-force the remaining bits efficiently or identify the correct password through limited attempts if multiple accounts are created within similar time windows.
To mitigate this vulnerability, it is imperative to upgrade Omnispace Agora Project to version 26.10.0 or later where the underlying implementation has been corrected. For systems that cannot be immediately upgraded, a temporary workaround involves replacing any usage of uniqid() for security-related identifiers with functions designed for cryptographic purposes, such as random_bytes() in PHP, which draws from the operating system's secure entropy source. Additionally, implementing rate limiting on account creation can reduce the window of opportunity for attackers to correlate timestamps with generated passwords. Security teams should also enforce immediate password changes upon first login and consider using multi-factor authentication to add a layer of defense that does not rely solely on the secrecy of the initial credential. Regular audits of codebases for similar patterns involving weak random number generators are recommended to prevent recurrence in other parts of the application logic.