CVE-2026-63160 in Agora Project
Summary
by MITRE • 10/13/2026
Omnispace Agora Project before 26.10.0 contains a vulnerability where the persistent remember-me token is stored verbatim server-side, making the stored value identical to the bearer credential held in the user's cookie. Attackers who gain access to the stored token, such as through database or backup disclosure, can replay the plaintext value to authenticate as the victim user without needing their password.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/14/2026
The vulnerability identified within Omnispace Agora Project versions prior to 26.10.0 represents a critical failure in authentication credential management and session handling mechanisms. The core technical flaw lies in how the system manages persistent remember-me tokens, which are designed to allow users to remain authenticated across browser sessions without re-entering credentials. In this specific implementation, the server stores these tokens using plaintext storage rather than applying cryptographic hashing or secure randomization techniques that would render stolen values useless for authentication purposes. Consequently, the token value stored in the backend database is an exact verbatim copy of the bearer credential presented by the user's browser cookie during each request. This architectural decision eliminates any security benefit derived from server-side state management and effectively transforms a session identifier into a static password equivalent that can be directly utilized for unauthorized access.
From a technical perspective, this flaw aligns with CWE-256, which covers the storage of passwords in a reversible format, although it specifically applies here to authentication tokens rather than traditional user passwords. The vulnerability also maps closely to CWE-384 regarding session fixation and CWE-614 concerning sensitive cookie information without sufficient separation from other data, as the token serves dual purposes of identification and authorization while being stored insecurely. Furthermore, this behavior is consistent with MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078, specifically valid accounts, where an adversary leverages legitimate credentials or tokens to gain access. The lack of entropy in the storage mechanism means that there is no computational barrier preventing an attacker from using a captured token immediately upon acquisition, bypassing any need for password cracking or brute-force attacks typically associated with credential theft scenarios.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe and directly correlates to unauthorized account takeover. If an attacker gains access to the application's database through methods such as SQL injection, improper backup exposure, or insider threats involving administrative privileges, they can extract these plaintext remember-me tokens. Once obtained, the attacker does not need to compromise any other part of the system or interact with the victim directly in real-time. Instead, they can simply configure their own browser cookie with the stolen token value and send requests to the application server. The server will validate this token against its stored copy, find an exact match, and grant full access to the associated user account without requiring a password check. This allows for persistent unauthorized access that persists until the token is rotated or revoked by the legitimate user or administrator.
Mitigation strategies must focus on immediate remediation of the storage mechanism and broader session management practices. The primary fix involves upgrading Omnispace Agora Project to version 26.10.0 or later, where this architectural flaw has been addressed. For systems that cannot be immediately upgraded, a critical workaround is to manually invalidate all existing remember-me tokens by clearing the relevant database entries or forcing a global session reset for affected users. Additionally, security teams should implement strict access controls on database backups and storage locations to prevent unauthorized disclosure of sensitive authentication data. Long-term remediation requires adopting industry-standard practices such as storing only hashed versions of tokens using strong cryptographic hash functions like SHA-256 with unique salts per user, ensuring that even if the database is compromised, the stolen values cannot be reversed or replayed for authentication purposes.