CVE-2026-63159 in Agora
Summary
by MITRE • 10/13/2026
Omnispace Agora Project before 26.10.0 contains a predictable password-reset token vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to take over user accounts by computing the reset token as sha1(login.password), a deterministic and reusable value. Attackers can derive or brute-force the reset token from known or guessed login and password combinations to forge valid password-reset requests and hijack arbitrary accounts.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/13/2026
The Omnispace Agora Project, prior to version 26.10.0, suffers from a critical authentication bypass vulnerability stemming from an insecure implementation of its password reset mechanism. This flaw allows unauthenticated attackers to perform account takeover attacks by exploiting the deterministic nature of the token generation algorithm used for resetting user passwords. The core technical issue lies in the fact that the system generates password-reset tokens using a simple cryptographic hash function, specifically SHA-1, applied directly to a combination of the user's login identifier and their current plaintext or known password. This approach fundamentally violates security best practices regarding secret generation, as it relies on entropy derived from credentials rather than random data generated by a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator.
From a technical perspective, the vulnerability is classified under CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials, specifically in the context of predictable secrets, and aligns with CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity if one considers how the system fails to ensure the token's uniqueness and unpredictability. The use of SHA-1 for this purpose is particularly problematic because while it provides a fixed-length output, it lacks the necessary entropy when applied directly to low-entropy inputs like usernames and passwords. Furthermore, SHA-1 has known cryptographic weaknesses regarding collision resistance, although in this specific context, the primary issue is predictability rather than collision exploitation. Because the token is computed as sha1(login.password), an attacker who knows or can guess a user's login credentials can instantly compute the exact reset token required to hijack that account without needing any interaction with the application’s frontend interface during the initial phase of the attack.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, enabling full account compromise for any user whose password has been exposed through data breaches, phishing attacks, or simple credential stuffing attempts. Attackers can leverage publicly available databases of leaked credentials to identify users who reuse passwords across different services. Once a valid login and password pair is identified from such sources, the attacker simply computes the SHA-1 hash of that combination to obtain the reset token. This allows them to initiate a password change request for the targeted account without triggering typical security alerts associated with brute-force attempts or random guessing, as each attempt corresponds to a real user’s credentials. The ability to forge valid password-reset requests effectively neutralizes the authentication layer's integrity, allowing attackers to assume control of sensitive accounts and potentially access proprietary data or perform actions on behalf of legitimate users.
This vulnerability maps directly to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078: Valid Accounts, where adversaries use legitimate credentials to gain initial access, combined with aspects of T1528: Steal Application Access Token if the reset token is treated as a session-like credential during the transition period before password change. The lack of rate limiting or additional verification steps further exacerbates the risk, allowing automated tools to rapidly test large volumes of leaked credentials against this predictable algorithm. To mitigate this issue, it is imperative that organizations running versions of Omnispace Agora Project earlier than 26.10.0 upgrade immediately to a patched version where the password reset token generation has been revised. The remediation should involve replacing the deterministic hash-based approach with a cryptographically secure random number generator for token creation. Additionally, implementing multi-factor authentication during the password reset process and enforcing strict rate limiting on reset requests can provide defense-in-depth measures against such exploitation attempts.