CVE-2026-65113 in Infrastructure Controller
Summary
by MITRE • 09/22/2026
NVIDIA Infrastructure Controller for Linux contains a vulnerability where an attacker could cause use of hard-coded credentials. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to escalation of privileges, data tampering, denial of service, and information disclosure.
If you want to get best quality of vulnerability data, you may have to visit VulDB.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/22/2026
The NVIDIA Infrastructure Controller for Linux represents a critical component in high-performance computing environments, serving as the management interface that oversees hardware health, firmware updates, and system configuration across GPU clusters. This specific vulnerability centers on the improper handling of authentication mechanisms within the controller software, specifically involving the use of hard-coded credentials. In secure software architecture, administrative access should be governed by dynamic, unique credential sets managed through a robust identity provider or local user database with strong password policies. However, in this instance, the application retains static, pre-defined username and password combinations that are embedded directly within the binary code or configuration files accessible to users with limited privileges. This design flaw fundamentally undermines the principle of least privilege and fails to adhere to modern security standards regarding credential management, creating a significant attack surface for malicious actors targeting NVIDIA DGX systems and similar infrastructure deployments.
From a technical perspective, this vulnerability is classified under CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials, which identifies scenarios where authentication data is statically defined within the source code or configuration files rather than being dynamically generated or stored securely in a protected vault. The presence of these hard-coded credentials allows an attacker who has gained even minimal access to the system, such as through a compromised user account or via network exposure if the management interface is not properly segmented, to bypass standard authentication checks. By leveraging these known default credentials, the attacker can authenticate directly into the infrastructure controller without needing valid user-generated passwords. This capability effectively neutralizes the primary defense mechanism of the administrative layer, granting unauthorized entities direct control over critical system functions that are intended to be restricted to authorized administrators only.
The operational impact of exploiting this vulnerability is severe and multifaceted, encompassing privilege escalation, data tampering, denial of service, and information disclosure. Once authenticated via hard-coded credentials, an attacker can escalate privileges from a standard user role to full administrative control over the NVIDIA Infrastructure Controller. This elevated access enables the modification of system configurations, potentially leading to deliberate denial of service by disrupting GPU operations or shutting down critical services essential for computational workloads. Furthermore, the attacker gains the ability to tamper with firmware updates and hardware settings, which could introduce backdoors or destabilize the entire cluster infrastructure. Additionally, the controller often holds sensitive information regarding network topology, IP addresses, and potentially encrypted keys used in inter-node communication; access to this data facilitates further lateral movement within the enterprise network and compromises the confidentiality of proprietary research or commercial data processed on these systems.
In alignment with industry frameworks, this vulnerability maps directly to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078: Valid Accounts, specifically describing how attackers use legitimate credentials that have been obtained through various means, including hard-coded defaults in software applications. The exploitation path also relates to initial access vectors where default or weak passwords are leveraged to gain a foothold within the network perimeter. To mitigate this risk, organizations must immediately audit their NVIDIA Infrastructure Controller deployments for any instances of hardcoded authentication mechanisms and ensure that all administrative accounts utilize strong, unique credentials managed through secure identity management systems. It is imperative to apply the latest security patches provided by NVIDIA, which typically replace hard-coded defaults with dynamic credential handling or remove unnecessary default access paths entirely. Furthermore, network segmentation strategies should be enforced to restrict access to the infrastructure controller interface solely from trusted management networks, thereby reducing the exposure surface even if authentication controls are compromised. Regular vulnerability scanning and penetration testing focused on default credential checks are recommended practices to maintain a robust security posture for high-performance computing environments.