CVE-2026-92929 in Apex Network Video Recorder
Summary
by MITRE • 09/23/2026
OpenEye Apex Network Video Recorder (NVR) firmware 3.2.9.376 trusts an X-Forwarded-For header supplied by an arbitrary client when determining the request source address. An unauthenticated remote attacker can spoof a loopback address to bypass local-connection-only security controls exposed on the affected non-TLS web interfaces and disclose configuration information. The underlying design has been present since at least firmware 2.2.3.4.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/23/2026
The vulnerability in OpenEye Apex Network Video Recorder firmware versions prior to 3.5.4, specifically affecting builds as early as 2.2.3.4 and including the cited build 3.2.9.376, stems from an insecure trust relationship with the X-Forwarded-For HTTP header. This header is commonly used in web architectures behind load balancers or reverse proxies to convey the original client IP address when direct connection information would otherwise reflect only the proxy's address. However, in this implementation, the NVR’s internal logic blindly accepts and utilizes the value provided by any arbitrary remote client without validation or sanitization. This design flaw allows an unauthenticated attacker to manipulate their perceived source address by injecting a spoofed X-Forwarded-For header containing a loopback address such as 127.0.0.1 into HTTP requests directed at the device’s web interface.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant because it enables the bypass of local-connection-only security controls that are exposed on non-TLS enabled interfaces within the NVR's administrative panel. Many embedded devices and network appliances implement access control lists or authentication mechanisms that restrict certain sensitive configuration endpoints to requests originating from localhost, assuming that only processes running directly on the device can send traffic to 127.0.0.1. By spoofing this loopback address via the X-Forwarded-For header, an attacker effectively tricks the application into believing the request is local rather than remote. This circumvention allows unauthorized access to configuration pages that should be inaccessible from external networks, leading to the disclosure of sensitive system information and potentially allowing further exploitation depending on the specific features exposed through these interfaces.
From a classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-346: Origin Validation Error, as the application fails to properly validate the origin of the request based on network-level indicators due to reliance on spoofable HTTP headers. It also relates to CWE-287: Improper Authentication, since the bypass allows unauthenticated users to access resources restricted by authentication or authorization policies that rely on IP-based restrictions. In terms of adversary tactics, this technique corresponds to ATT&CK T1090.003: Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy, where attackers use indirect methods to hide their true location and evade detection mechanisms that monitor for specific source IPs. The persistence of this flaw since firmware version 2.2.3.4 indicates a fundamental architectural oversight in how the web server handles proxy headers across multiple major releases.
To mitigate this risk, administrators must upgrade the OpenEye Apex NVR to version 3.5.4 or later, which addresses the improper validation logic associated with the X-Forwarded-For header. Until an update is applied, it is critical to ensure that any web interfaces exposed on non-TLS ports are not accessible from untrusted networks. Network segmentation should be enforced so that administrative interfaces are only reachable via trusted internal subnets where IP spoofing is less likely or can be mitigated at the network layer through ingress filtering and anti-spoofing rules such as those defined in RFC 2827. Additionally, disabling unnecessary web services on external-facing interfaces reduces the attack surface available for this type of header manipulation exploit.