CVE-2026-69683 in SharePoint Server
Summary
by MITRE • 09/09/2026
Server-side request forgery (ssrf) in Microsoft Office SharePoint allows an authorized attacker to disclose information over a network.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/09/2026
The vulnerability identified as Server-Side Request Forgery within the context of Microsoft Office SharePoint represents a critical security flaw that exploits the trust relationship between the application server and internal or external networks. In this specific scenario, an authenticated user is able to manipulate the server into making HTTP requests to arbitrary destinations. This capability arises from insufficient validation of user-supplied input when constructing outbound network connections. Instead of restricting these requests to predefined, safe domains or IP ranges, the application processes URLs provided by the attacker without adequate sanitization. Consequently, the SharePoint service acts as a proxy for malicious actors, allowing them to leverage its elevated privileges and network access to interact with internal resources that would otherwise be inaccessible from the public internet or untrusted networks.
The technical mechanism behind this flaw typically involves parameters such as file paths, image URLs, or webhook endpoints where user input is directly concatenated into request objects without proper validation of the target host. By crafting a malicious payload containing an IP address pointing to internal services like database servers, metadata stores, or other microservices within the organization's infrastructure, an attacker can force the SharePoint server to initiate connections on their behalf. This bypasses network-level access controls such as firewalls and intrusion detection systems that might block direct external-to-internal traffic but permit outbound requests from trusted application servers. The vulnerability is particularly dangerous because it allows for reconnaissance of internal network topology, discovery of sensitive data stored in backend services, and potentially further exploitation through interaction with vulnerable internal applications.
From an operational impact perspective, the ability to disclose information over a network can lead to significant confidentiality breaches. Attackers may extract sensitive configuration files, database credentials, or proprietary business logic from internal systems that are not exposed directly to the internet. This access facilitates lateral movement within the enterprise environment, as discovered secrets and service endpoints provide footholds for deeper penetration. Furthermore, if the SharePoint instance has permissions to interact with cloud-based services or APIs, the attacker could potentially exfiltrate data to external servers under their control. The impact extends beyond mere information disclosure; it undermines the integrity of the entire security perimeter by turning a trusted application into an attack vector against internal assets.
This vulnerability aligns closely with Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers such as CWE-918, which describes Server-Side Request Forgery, and often intersects with CWE-20 regarding Improper Input Validation. In the context of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, this behavior corresponds to techniques used in reconnaissance phases, specifically T1560.001 for Archive Collected Data via Local Scripting or more broadly within lateral movement strategies where internal services are abused. The exploitation relies on the principle that the server is trusted by network security devices, allowing it to bypass perimeter defenses effectively.
Mitigation of this vulnerability requires a multi-layered approach focusing on input validation and network segmentation. Developers must implement strict allow-lists for outbound connections, ensuring that only requests to explicitly approved domains or IP ranges are permitted. Input sanitization should be applied rigorously to all parameters involved in constructing URLs or file paths, rejecting any attempts to use internal IP addresses, localhost references, or non-standard ports. Additionally, organizations should deploy network-level controls such as egress filtering and proxy servers that inspect outbound traffic for anomalies. Regular security audits and penetration testing focused on SSRF vectors are essential to identify similar weaknesses across the application portfolio before they can be exploited by adversaries seeking to compromise internal infrastructure.