CVE-2026-81640 in C6 Ear Camerainfo

Summary

by MITRE • 09/09/2026

An attacker could derive the camera's Wi-Fi password and connect to its wireless network. This weakens or eliminates the security value of the access-point password and may expose the live video stream, device services, status interfaces, and firmware-update functionality.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 09/09/2026

The vulnerability described represents a critical failure in cryptographic implementation within IoT camera devices, specifically allowing an attacker to derive the Wi-Fi pre-shared key from internal data or configuration files stored on the device. This flaw fundamentally undermines the security model of WPA2-Personal networks by rendering the password effectively public knowledge once the attacker gains access to specific system artifacts. The ability to extract this credential suggests that sensitive authentication material is either stored in plaintext, encrypted with a weak key known to the attacker, or protected by reversible obfuscation techniques rather than robust cryptographic hashing and salting mechanisms. This type of flaw aligns closely with CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials, as it often involves static keys or predictable derivation methods that do not change per device instance or session, thereby allowing any adversary who can access the file system to replicate the authentication material across multiple devices if they share a common firmware image.

From an operational perspective, successfully deriving the Wi-Fi password allows the attacker to bypass network-level perimeter defenses entirely. By connecting directly to the camera's wireless local area network, the threat actor gains unrestricted Layer 3 connectivity to all services hosted on the device. This includes real-time video streaming interfaces which may lack additional authentication layers beyond the initial network connection, potentially exposing sensitive visual data of private spaces such as homes or offices. Furthermore, access to status interfaces and firmware-update functionality poses significant risks for further compromise. An attacker could manipulate configuration settings, disable logging mechanisms to cover their tracks, or install malicious firmware that persists across reboots, effectively turning the device into a persistent foothold within the network infrastructure. This scenario is consistent with ATT&CK technique T1078: Valid Accounts, where legitimate credentials are abused for unauthorized access, and potentially T1530: Data from Local System, if the extraction process involves reading sensitive files directly from the storage medium.

The implications of this vulnerability extend beyond the immediate compromise of a single device. In environments with multiple cameras or IoT devices using similar firmware builds, an attacker who derives one password may be able to access others due to shared cryptographic seeds or default configurations. This lateral movement capability can serve as an entry point into broader corporate or residential networks if the camera is not properly segmented on a separate VLAN. The exposure of live video streams violates privacy expectations and data protection regulations such as GDPR, while unauthorized firmware updates could lead to remote code execution vulnerabilities being exploited in subsequent attacks. Mitigation strategies must focus on eliminating hard-coded secrets by implementing unique per-device cryptographic keys generated during manufacturing or first boot. Additionally, devices should enforce strong authentication for all web-based management interfaces regardless of network location and ensure that sensitive configuration files are stored with appropriate file system permissions and encrypted using industry-standard algorithms like AES-256-GCM rather than simple obfuscation. Regular firmware updates addressing these cryptographic weaknesses are essential to restore the integrity of the device's security posture.

Responsible

Icscert

Reservation

09/03/2026

Disclosure

09/09/2026

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00000

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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