CVE-2026-86756 in Snipe-IT
Summary
by MITRE • 09/09/2026
Snipe-IT 8.5.0 through 8.6.3 contains an open redirect vulnerability in its SAML assertion-consumer endpoint (SamlController::acs, POST /saml/acs). The endpoint wrote the RelayState POST parameter directly into Laravel's url.intended session key with only CR/LF characters stripped, and LoginController later issued redirect()->intended(), which passes an absolute URL through to the Location header unchanged. An unauthenticated attacker who induces a user of a SAML-SSO-enabled instance to visit a crafted IdP-initiated SSO link can therefore cause the victim's browser to be redirected to an arbitrary absolute external URL immediately after a successful authentication, which the advisory notes facilitates credential-harvesting phishing. No account on the target instance and no compromise of the identity provider are required. Only deployments with SAML SSO enabled are affected. Fixed in 8.7.0 (commit d30b73d, PR #19386), which validates RelayState via a new Helper::sameOriginUrl check before storing it.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/09/2026
The vulnerability identified in Snipe-IT versions 8.5.0 through 8.6.3 represents a critical open redirect flaw located within the SAML assertion-consumer endpoint, specifically at SamlController::acs handling POST requests to /saml/acs. This security defect arises from improper validation of user-supplied input during the Single Sign-On authentication flow. When an identity provider initiates a SSO request, it includes a RelayState parameter intended to preserve application state across the redirect loop. The vulnerable implementation in these versions processes this parameter by stripping only carriage return and line feed characters before storing its value directly into Laravel's url.intended session key. This insufficient sanitization allows absolute URLs containing malicious payloads or external domains to be persisted within the session data without triggering validation errors, thereby bypassing standard security controls designed to prevent redirection attacks.
The operational impact of this flaw is significant because it enables unauthenticated attackers to manipulate the post-authentication redirect behavior for any user interacting with a SAML-enabled instance. The Laravel framework's LoginController utilizes the url.intended key via its redirect()->intended() method, which retrieves the stored URL and issues an HTTP 302 response with that value in the Location header. Because the application fails to verify whether this URL belongs to the same origin as the Snipe-IT instance, it blindly passes absolute external URLs through to the browser unchanged. This mechanism allows an attacker who controls a malicious identity provider or can craft a specific SSO link to force the victim's browser to navigate away from the legitimate Snipe-IT login page immediately after successful authentication. The lack of requirement for existing accounts on the target instance or compromise of the actual identity provider makes this vulnerability particularly dangerous, as it relies solely on social engineering tactics where users are induced to visit a crafted SSO link.
From an industry standards perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-601, which defines Open Redirect vulnerabilities resulting from insufficient validation of user-supplied input used in redirect operations. The attack vector is consistent with ATT&CK technique T1566.002, specifically Spearphishing Link, where attackers use crafted links to deceive users into visiting malicious sites under the guise of legitimate services. In this context, the open redirect facilitates credential-harvesting phishing campaigns by directing victims to a look-alike login page hosted on an attacker-controlled domain immediately after they believe they have successfully authenticated with Snipe-IT. This deception can lead to the theft of credentials or further compromise if users enter sensitive information into the fraudulent site. The vulnerability highlights the risks associated with trusting RelayState parameters in SAML flows without rigorous origin validation, a common pitfall in web application security when integrating third-party identity providers.
Mitigation for this issue requires immediate patching to Snipe-IT version 8.7.0 or later, which addresses the flaw through commit d30b73d and pull request #19386. The fix implements a new Helper::sameOriginUrl check that validates the RelayState parameter before it is stored in the session. This validation ensures that only URLs belonging to the same origin as the Snipe-IT deployment are permitted, effectively neutralizing the open redirect capability. For organizations unable to patch immediately due to operational constraints, temporary mitigations should include restricting SAML integration to trusted identity providers and monitoring for unusual redirection patterns in web server logs. Additionally, implementing strict Content Security Policy headers with a script-src directive that restricts execution from untrusted origins can provide an additional layer of defense against the phishing aspects associated with this vulnerability. Regular security audits focusing on authentication flows and redirect logic are recommended to prevent similar issues in future updates or custom integrations.