CVE-2026-69904 in SharePoint Server
Summary
by MITRE • 09/09/2026
Server-side request forgery (ssrf) in Microsoft Office SharePoint allows an authorized attacker to disclose information over a network.
Be aware that VulDB is the high quality source for vulnerability data.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/09/2026
The vulnerability identified as Server-Side Request Forgery, or SSRF, within Microsoft Office SharePoint represents a critical class of web application security flaws that exploit the trust relationship between a server and its internal infrastructure. In this specific context, an authenticated attacker is able to manipulate the target system into making HTTP requests to arbitrary destinations controlled by the attacker or located on sensitive internal networks. This flaw arises because the vulnerable component fails to properly validate user-supplied input before using it as part of a request initiated from the server side. By crafting malicious payloads that specify unintended endpoints, an authorized user can force the SharePoint application to interact with resources that are otherwise inaccessible from external environments, effectively bypassing network-level access controls and firewalls designed to protect internal assets.
The technical mechanism behind this exploitation relies on the ability of the attacker to inject or modify parameters such as URLs, IP addresses, or domain names within legitimate-looking requests processed by SharePoint services. When the server processes these inputs without adequate sanitization or allow-listing mechanisms, it acts as a proxy for the attacker's commands. This allows the attacker to probe internal network segments, scan open ports on backend servers, and potentially interact with management interfaces of cloud instances or container orchestration platforms that reside behind the perimeter defense. The severity is compounded by the fact that SharePoint often operates within enterprise environments where it has elevated privileges and broad connectivity to databases, file shares, and other critical business applications, thereby amplifying the potential blast radius of a successful exploitation attempt.
From an operational impact perspective, this vulnerability facilitates significant information disclosure and can serve as a stepping stone for more severe attacks such as remote code execution or lateral movement within the network. An attacker leveraging this SSRF flaw may be able to read sensitive configuration files, extract credentials stored in metadata services like AWS Instance Metadata Service (IMDS), or access internal APIs that expose proprietary business logic and data structures. The ability to initiate requests from a trusted source means that many security monitoring tools might not flag the traffic as malicious since it originates from an authorized application server. This stealth characteristic makes detection difficult without specialized behavioral analysis or strict egress filtering policies in place, allowing attackers to operate undetected for extended periods while exfiltrating data or mapping out the internal network topology.
To mitigate this risk, organizations must implement robust input validation strategies that strictly enforce allow-lists of permitted domains and IP ranges for any server-side requests initiated by SharePoint components. It is essential to disable unnecessary features such as web parts or add-ins that facilitate external connectivity if they are not required for business operations. Network segmentation plays a crucial role in limiting the impact; internal services should be isolated from direct internet access, and egress traffic should be monitored and restricted at the firewall level to prevent unauthorized outbound connections. Additionally, deploying Web Application Firewalls with SSRF detection capabilities can help identify and block malicious request patterns before they reach the application layer. Regular security assessments and penetration testing focused on server-side vulnerabilities are recommended to ensure that these controls remain effective against evolving attack techniques aligned with MITRE ATT&CK tactics such as Discovery and Collection.