CVE-2026-71235 in Magistrala
Summary
by MITRE • 08/05/2026
Magistrala's Rules Engine allows authenticated users to create rules with embedded Go or Lua scripts executed server-side when IoT messages arrive. The Go script engine (re/golang.go) runs scripts through the Yaegi interpreter with stdlib.Symbols, exposing the full Go standard library (including os and net/http) with validation limited to a regex blocking goroutines and panic() calls; dangerous functions such as os.ReadFile, os.WriteFile, os.Remove, and os.Environ remain fully accessible. The Lua script engine (re/lua.go) performs no input validation at all and preloads dangerous libraries: db (arbitrary database access), ioutil (file I/O), an HTTP client (SSRF), and filepath (traversal). An authenticated low-privileged user can achieve arbitrary file read/write, environment variable leakage, database access, and SSRF against internal microservices.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/05/2026
The vulnerability in Magistrala's Rules Engine represents a critical server-side code execution flaw that stems from insufficient input validation and overly permissive script execution environments. This weakness allows authenticated users to inject malicious code that gets executed server-side when IoT messages are processed, creating a pathway for privilege escalation and lateral movement within the system. The security architecture fails to properly sandbox or restrict the capabilities available to user-defined scripts, enabling attackers to leverage the full power of both Go and Lua scripting environments.
The technical flaw manifests through two distinct but equally dangerous script engines operating with minimal security controls. The Go script engine utilizes the Yaegi interpreter which, while providing a convenient way to execute Go code, exposes the complete standard library including os and net/http packages despite implementing only basic regex-based restrictions that block goroutines and panic calls. This validation mechanism proves insufficient as it fails to prevent access to critical functions such as os.ReadFile, os.WriteFile, os.Remove, and os.Environ which provide direct system-level access. The Lua engine compounds this risk by preloading dangerous libraries including database access modules, file I/O utilities, HTTP clients, and path traversal tools without any input sanitization or access controls.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends far beyond simple code execution, creating a comprehensive attack surface that enables multiple high-severity threats. Low-privileged authenticated users can achieve arbitrary file read/write capabilities, potentially accessing sensitive configuration files, credentials, or system resources. The exposure of environment variables through os.Environ creates additional information leakage opportunities that could reveal secrets, API keys, or internal system configurations. Database access via the preloaded db library allows attackers to extract, modify, or delete data from internal databases, while the HTTP client library enables server-side request forgery attacks against other internal microservices. This combination of capabilities effectively transforms a low-privileged user account into a powerful attacker position capable of performing extensive reconnaissance and exploitation.
This vulnerability aligns with multiple CWE categories including CWE-94 (Improper Control of Generation of Code) and CWE-78 (Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in OS Commands) while mapping to ATT&CK techniques such as T1059.007 (Scripting) and T1566 (Phishing). The attack vector represents a classic case of insecure scripting environments where user input is not properly validated or restricted, leading to privilege escalation through code injection. Organizations should implement immediate mitigations including disabling script execution functionality, implementing strict input validation, applying principle of least privilege controls, and deploying network segmentation to limit access to internal services. Additionally, regular security audits and proper sandboxing mechanisms should be enforced to prevent similar issues in future implementations.