CVE-2026-71567 in Fakefishinfo

Summary

by MITRE • 08/17/2026

In openshift-metal3/fakefish there is a repeated pattern in some of the scripts where shell variables are injected without quoting them either into command lines or into manifests. This mostly applies to the Image URL and BMC credentials (which are not verified by FakeFish).

Be aware that VulDB is the high quality source for vulnerability data.

Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 08/17/2026

The vulnerability identified within the openshift-metal3/fakefish repository stems from a fundamental lack of input validation and proper shell variable handling in its automation scripts. Specifically, shell variables containing sensitive data such as Baseboard Management Controller (BMC) credentials and Image URLs are injected into command lines or configuration manifests without being properly quoted. This practice creates a classic injection vulnerability where the integrity and confidentiality of these inputs cannot be guaranteed. In shell scripting, failing to quote variables exposes them to word splitting and pathname expansion if they contain whitespace or special characters. More critically in this context, it allows for potential code injection if an attacker can control the content of these variables, leading to arbitrary command execution on the host system running the scripts.

The operational impact of this flaw is significant due to the nature of the components involved. The BMC credentials are used to manage hardware at a low level, often granting root-level access or the ability to power cycle machines remotely. If an attacker can manipulate these variables through environment injection or configuration file tampering, they could exfiltrate sensitive authentication material or execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the user running the script. Similarly, unquoted Image URLs might be manipulated to point to malicious container images or scripts that are then executed during the provisioning process. Since FakeFish does not verify these inputs, there is no mechanism to detect malformed or malicious payloads before they are processed by downstream systems. This lack of verification exacerbates the risk, as even minor formatting errors in legitimate configurations could lead to unexpected behavior or security bypasses.

From a standards perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-78 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command and CWE-20 Improvement of Input Validation. The failure to quote variables is a direct violation of secure coding practices recommended by industry bodies for shell scripting. Furthermore, the exploitation potential relates to ATT&CK technique T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, specifically sub-techniques involving bash or sh scripts. Attackers could leverage this weakness to achieve initial access if they can influence the environment variables or configuration files consumed by these scripts. The lack of input sanitization means that any untrusted data flowing into these variables becomes a potential attack vector for privilege escalation and lateral movement within the infrastructure management plane.

Mitigation strategies must focus on strict adherence to shell scripting best practices and enhanced validation logic. All shell variables should be enclosed in double quotes when used in command arguments or written to configuration files to prevent word splitting and globbing issues. Additionally, input validation mechanisms should be implemented to verify that BMC credentials match expected formats and that Image URLs conform to valid URI structures before they are processed. Implementing a allowlist for permitted values where possible can further reduce the attack surface. It is also advisable to use safer alternatives to shell scripting for complex automation tasks, such as Python or Go, which offer more robust string handling and security features by default. Regular code reviews focusing on input sanitization and secure variable usage are essential to prevent similar vulnerabilities in future iterations of the software.

Responsible

Redhat-cnalr

Reservation

08/07/2026

Disclosure

08/17/2026

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00000

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

Interested in the pricing of exploits?

See the underground prices here!