CVE-2026-73166 in EKI-1242IEIMS
Summary
by MITRE • 09/16/2026
Nozomi Networks Labs identified a CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection') vulnerability in the web management interface of Advantech EKI-1242IEIMS in firmware version V1.06.01 that allows a remote authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code on the device, including OS commands as root.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/16/2026
The identification of CWE-94, Improper Control of Generation of Code, within the Advantech EKI-1242IEIMS industrial Ethernet switch firmware version V1.06.01 represents a critical security failure in an operational technology environment. This vulnerability specifically targets the web-based management interface, which serves as the primary administrative entry point for network configuration and monitoring. The flaw stems from insufficient sanitization or validation of user-supplied input before it is processed by backend scripts or system commands. When an attacker provides maliciously crafted data that contains executable code fragments, such as shell metacharacters or command sequences, the application fails to distinguish between legitimate administrative parameters and destructive payloads. This lack of rigorous input filtering allows the underlying operating system interpreter to execute these injected strings directly, effectively bypassing any intended security boundaries within the web interface layer.
The operational impact of this code injection vulnerability is severe due to the privilege level granted upon successful exploitation. The advisory indicates that a remote authenticated attacker can achieve arbitrary code execution with root privileges on the device itself. In industrial control systems and critical infrastructure networks, devices like Ethernet switches are foundational components responsible for traffic routing, segmentation, and connectivity between supervisory control and data acquisition systems and field-level equipment. Compromising such a device at the root level grants an adversary complete control over its functionality. This includes the ability to modify network configurations, intercept or manipulate industrial protocols such as Modbus TCP or Ethernet/IP, disable logging mechanisms to cover tracks, and potentially pivot into other segments of the OT network. The presence of authentication requirements does not mitigate this risk significantly in many operational environments where default credentials are common or administrative accounts may be shared across multiple personnel with varying levels of security awareness.
From a threat modeling perspective, this vulnerability aligns closely with MITRE ATT&CK techniques related to command and script interpretation as well as lateral movement within industrial networks. An attacker leveraging this flaw can establish persistent access by modifying startup scripts or creating new administrative accounts, ensuring continued control even after device reboots. Furthermore, the ability to execute OS commands allows for reconnaissance activities such as scanning internal network segments from the compromised switch’s perspective, which is often less likely to trigger intrusion detection systems compared to external scans. This capability facilitates deeper penetration into sensitive areas of the industrial process, potentially leading to physical consequences if connected safety instrumented systems or programmable logic controllers are impacted by altered traffic patterns or configuration changes initiated through this vulnerability.
Mitigation strategies must address both immediate remediation and long-term architectural resilience. The most effective countermeasure is to apply the vendor-provided firmware update that patches the input validation flaws in the web management interface as soon as it becomes available. Until patching can be performed, organizations should implement strict network segmentation policies to restrict access to the device’s management IP address exclusively from trusted administrative workstations or jump hosts using firewall rules and VLAN isolation. Additionally, enforcing strong, unique passwords for all administrative accounts and disabling unused services on the switch reduces the attack surface. Regular vulnerability assessments focused specifically on industrial IoT devices are essential to identify similar weaknesses in other connected assets before they can be exploited by threat actors targeting critical infrastructure sectors.