CVE-2026-74764 in Pandora
Summary
by MITRE • 08/15/2026
Pandora contains a path traversal vulnerability in its TAR archive extraction functionality. When processing a submitted TAR archive, the extractor passed archive member names directly to Python's tarfile.TarFile.extract() without applying an extraction filter.
An attacker able to submit a specially crafted TAR archive containing malicious member paths, such as paths using ../ sequences or absolute paths, could cause extracted files to be written outside the intended extraction directory. This may allow the attacker to overwrite files accessible to the Pandora worker process and could potentially result in application compromise, arbitrary code execution, or denial of service depending on the files targeted and the privileges of the Pandora process.
The vulnerability is corrected by using Python's filter='data' extraction filter, which rejects or sanitizes dangerous TAR members, including paths that escape the destination directory and unsafe link targets.
The weakness corresponds to MITRE's general path traversal category, which includes archive extraction cases where attacker-controlled filenames cause files to be written outside the intended directory.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/15/2026
The vulnerability in Pandora stems from insufficient input validation during TAR archive processing, creating a path traversal condition that can be exploited by malicious actors. This flaw exists within the tarfile.TarFile.extract() method implementation where archive member names are processed without proper sanitization or filtering mechanisms. The core technical issue manifests when the application accepts user-supplied TAR archives and directly passes member paths to Python's extraction functions without verifying their safety or containment within the intended target directory.
This vulnerability falls under CWE-22 Path Traversal, a well-documented weakness category that encompasses situations where unfiltered user input allows attackers to manipulate file system operations. The specific implementation flaw aligns with ATT&CK technique T1059.007 for command and scripting interpreter, as it enables attackers to potentially execute arbitrary code through file overwrites or privilege escalation scenarios. The absence of proper path validation creates a direct attack surface where malicious paths containing sequences like ../ or absolute paths can bypass intended directory boundaries.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple file system manipulation to encompass potential application compromise and system-level attacks. When an attacker crafts a malicious TAR archive with carefully constructed member paths, they can cause the extraction process to write files outside the designated extraction directory. This capability allows for overwriting critical system files, configuration files, or even executable components that are accessible to the Pandora worker process, potentially leading to complete system compromise.
The severity of this vulnerability is heightened by the privileges under which the Pandora process operates, as any file overwrites or modifications performed through path traversal can result in arbitrary code execution or denial of service conditions. Depending on the target files and system permissions, attackers may be able to escalate their privileges, install backdoors, or disrupt normal application operations. The vulnerability represents a critical security gap that requires immediate remediation to prevent unauthorized access and potential data breaches.
The recommended mitigation strategy involves implementing Python's built-in filter='data' extraction filter which provides robust protection against dangerous TAR members by sanitizing or rejecting potentially harmful paths. This approach addresses the root cause by preventing the extraction of archive members that could escape the destination directory or contain unsafe link targets. The solution aligns with security best practices for archive handling and follows industry standards for preventing path traversal attacks in file processing applications, effectively neutralizing the attack vector while maintaining legitimate functionality.
Additional defensive measures should include implementing comprehensive input validation for all archive member names, establishing strict directory containment policies, and monitoring extraction activities for suspicious path patterns. These controls complement the core fix by providing multiple layers of protection against similar vulnerabilities and ensuring that even if other security measures fail, the system remains resilient against path traversal attacks. The remediation process should also include thorough testing to verify that legitimate archive processing continues to function correctly while eliminating the identified attack vectors.