CVE-2026-75370 in SpaceDot
Summary
by MITRE • 08/24/2026
An out-of-bounds read/write vulnerability in the MessageParser::parseECSSTCHeader component of SpaceDot AcubeSAT OBC software commit eaf90ec allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via supplying a crafted CAN message.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/24/2026
The identified vulnerability resides within the MessageParser::parseECSSTCHeader function, which is part of the On-Board Computer software for SpaceDot AcubeSAT. This component is responsible for parsing and validating headers from Controller Area Network messages received by the satellite's avionics system. The specific flaw constitutes an out-of-bounds read or write condition, indicating that the parser fails to adequately validate input data lengths against allocated buffer boundaries before accessing memory locations. When a malicious actor supplies a crafted CAN message with malformed header fields, such as incorrect length indicators or unexpected payload structures, the software may attempt to access memory addresses outside the intended scope of its buffers. This lack of rigorous bounds checking is a critical failure in defensive programming practices for embedded systems operating in space environments where fault tolerance and reliability are paramount.
From a technical perspective, this vulnerability aligns with Common Weakness Enumeration identifiers such as CWE-125 Out-of-bounds Read or CWE-787 Out-of-bounds Write, depending on the specific memory access pattern triggered by the crafted input. The exploitation of this flaw allows an attacker to disrupt normal system operations, leading primarily to a Denial of Service condition. In the context of satellite communications, where CAN bus networks are commonly used for internal subsystem communication, injecting malicious messages can cause the parser to crash or enter an undefined state. This disruption prevents legitimate telemetry and command processing, effectively isolating the affected subsystem from the rest of the spacecraft's operational network. The severity is amplified by the fact that CAN protocols often lack built-in authentication mechanisms at the link layer, making them susceptible to such injection attacks if not properly secured at higher application layers or through physical access controls.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple service interruption. A successful exploitation could lead to data corruption if an out-of-bounds write occurs, potentially overwriting critical control parameters or configuration settings stored in adjacent memory regions. This scenario poses a significant risk to the integrity and safety of the satellite mission. Furthermore, according to MITRE ATT&CK for Space framework, this type of vulnerability facilitates techniques related to Command and Control disruption or Sensor Data Manipulation. An adversary could leverage this flaw to degrade the quality of scientific data collection or prevent critical maneuvers from being executed by compromising the onboard computer's ability to process incoming commands reliably. The persistence of such a defect in flight software underscores the necessity for rigorous static analysis and fuzzing during the development lifecycle, particularly for components handling external inputs over open bus architectures.
Mitigation strategies must focus on implementing robust input validation within the MessageParser::parseECSSTCHeader function. Developers should enforce strict length checks to ensure that all header fields do not exceed predefined limits before any memory access operations are performed. Additionally, incorporating bounds-checking libraries or using safer programming constructs can prevent out-of-bounds accesses even if logic errors occur. It is also advisable to implement redundancy in critical parsing routines and include watchdog timers to reset the system if it becomes unresponsive due to a crash caused by malformed messages. For long-term resilience, integrating authentication mechanisms for CAN bus communications, such as using secure key management protocols defined in standards like ISO 15764 or specific space industry guidelines, can help detect and reject unauthorized or maliciously crafted messages before they reach the vulnerable parser component. Regular security audits and penetration testing of flight software are essential to identify and remediate similar weaknesses across the entire avionics stack.