CVE-2026-77134 in femanager
Summary
by MITRE • 08/25/2026
The extension fails to require the dedicated admin confirmation token when processing an admin-approval request, so a regular user confirmation hash, obtainable by any visitor through the public resend-confirmation action, is sufficient to self-approve a pending account awaiting admin approval.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/25/2026
This vulnerability represents a critical authentication bypass within the administrative workflow of web applications that utilize email-based account verification coupled with manual administrator approval processes. The core technical flaw lies in the failure of the application logic to distinguish between standard user confirmation tokens and privileged administrative approval tokens during the processing of an admin-approval request. Typically, systems generate two distinct types of cryptographic hashes: one for initial email address validation sent to all new users, and another specifically reserved for administrators to manually approve accounts that require additional scrutiny or fall outside automated acceptance criteria. In this flawed implementation, the backend endpoint responsible for finalizing account activation does not enforce strict token type verification. Consequently, it accepts any valid confirmation hash present in the request parameters, regardless of its origin or intended scope.
The operational impact of this flaw is severe, as it allows an unauthenticated attacker to escalate privileges from a standard user role to that of an approved member without requiring administrative intervention. An adversary can exploit this by initiating the public resend-confirmation action for any target account awaiting approval. This action generates and delivers a standard confirmation hash to the associated email address or exposes it through predictable URL patterns if not properly secured. By submitting this regular token to the admin-approval endpoint, the attacker effectively self-approves their own pending account. This bypasses all security controls designed to prevent unauthorized access, such as manual review queues, automated spam filters that rely on approval status, and role-based access control mechanisms that depend on verified membership status.
From a vulnerability classification perspective, this issue aligns with CWE-287, which describes Improper Authentication, specifically the failure to verify credentials or tokens correctly during an authorization decision process. It also relates closely to CWE-613, Insufficient Session Expiration, if the token reuse is facilitated by long-lived session states, though the primary defect is the lack of specific validation for administrative contexts. In terms of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, this behavior facilitates Account Manipulation and Privilege Escalation techniques, allowing an attacker to establish a foothold within the system under legitimate credentials that have bypassed intended security gates. The attack vector is typically classified as remote with low complexity, requiring only knowledge of the target email address or account ID to initiate the token generation process.
Mitigation strategies must focus on strict separation of concerns between user-facing and administrative workflows. Developers should implement distinct API endpoints for standard confirmation and admin approval, ensuring that each endpoint validates a specific type of cryptographic token generated by its corresponding service layer. The backend logic must verify not only the validity and expiration of the provided hash but also its metadata or context identifier to confirm it was issued specifically for an administrative action. Additionally, implementing rate limiting on both the resend-confirmation and admin-approval endpoints can help mitigate automated exploitation attempts. Security headers should be configured to prevent information leakage that might aid in identifying pending accounts, and all token generation processes must utilize cryptographically secure random number generators to ensure unpredictability of the hashes involved.