CVE-2026-76175 in Ocsreports
Summary
by MITRE • 09/03/2026
SQL injection vulnerability in the del_check parameter of the /ocsreports/?function=save_query_list endpoint. Input provided by an authenticated user with operator privileges is incorporated into an SQL query without proper parameterisation or validation, allowing the query to be manipulated and information to be extracted from the database using SQL injection techniques.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/03/2026
The vulnerability identified in the OCS Inventory NG software represents a critical security flaw within its web-based reporting interface, specifically targeting the del_check parameter located at the /ocsreports/?function=save_query_list endpoint. This component is designed to handle user inputs for managing saved query lists, yet it fails to implement adequate safeguards against malicious input manipulation. The root cause of this issue lies in the server-side processing logic, which incorporates data provided by authenticated users directly into SQL database queries without employing proper parameterization or rigorous validation mechanisms. In secure software development practices, all external inputs must be treated as untrusted and processed through prepared statements or stored procedures to ensure that user-supplied data is interpreted strictly as data rather than executable code. The absence of these protective measures creates a direct pathway for attackers to inject arbitrary SQL commands into the application's backend database operations.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, particularly because it requires only operator-level privileges to exploit. While authentication and role-based access control are in place, they do not mitigate the risk posed by insufficient input sanitization within specific endpoints. An attacker with valid credentials at the operator level can craft a malicious payload for the del_check parameter that alters the structure of the intended SQL query. By doing so, the attacker can bypass logical controls or extract sensitive information from the database that should remain inaccessible. This capability allows for unauthorized data disclosure, potentially exposing confidential inventory details, user configurations, and other proprietary system information stored within the OCS Inventory NG database. The ability to manipulate queries also opens the door to more advanced attacks such as modifying existing records or deleting critical data entries if the underlying SQL execution context permits write operations.
From a technical classification perspective, this flaw aligns with Common Weakness Enumeration identifier CWE-89, which describes Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command, commonly known as SQL Injection. The vulnerability stems from a failure to separate code from data during query construction, allowing special characters and syntactic elements within the input to be interpreted by the database engine as part of the command structure rather than literal values. This misinterpretation is further exacerbated by the lack of context-aware encoding or strict type checking on the del_check parameter before it is concatenated into the SQL string executed by the backend system.
In terms of offensive security frameworks, this vulnerability maps to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1059, specifically sub-technique 004 which covers Command and Scripting Interpretation via SQL Injection. The exploitation path involves an authenticated user leveraging their existing access rights to execute arbitrary database commands through the web application interface. This scenario highlights a common pitfall in enterprise asset management tools where administrative or operator interfaces are perceived as safe due to authentication requirements, yet remain vulnerable to injection attacks if input handling is not strictly enforced at every layer of the request processing pipeline.
To mitigate this vulnerability, immediate remediation steps should focus on refactoring the code responsible for handling the del_check parameter in the save_query_list function. Developers must replace direct string concatenation with prepared statements using parameterized queries, ensuring that all user inputs are bound as variables rather than being embedded directly into SQL syntax. Additionally implementing strict input validation routines can provide a secondary layer of defense by rejecting any input containing characters or patterns commonly associated with SQL injection attempts, such as single quotes, semicolons, or specific comment sequences. Regular security audits and static code analysis tools should be employed to detect similar weaknesses across the application's other endpoints, ensuring that no other areas suffer from inadequate parameterization practices.