CVE-2026-77061 in boneIO
Summary
by MITRE • 10/26/2026
boneIO Black directly excludes several API endpoints from the authentication. An unauthenticated remote attacker on the local network can retrieve system logs, firmware version, serial number, MQTT username, configuration file listings, and API documentation. This data aids reconnaissance and enables targeted attacks against the device. This issue was fixed in version 1.6.0: every API route requires an authenticated role, the interactive API documentation is disabled, and the serial number is withheld from anonymous callers.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/26/2026
The vulnerability identified as boneIO Black directly excludes several API endpoints from authentication requirements represents a critical misconfiguration within the device's web server architecture. This flaw allows unauthenticated remote attackers operating on the local network to access sensitive system information without providing valid credentials. The affected endpoints expose detailed operational data including system logs, firmware version identifiers, hardware serial numbers, MQTT username configurations, listings of configuration files, and comprehensive API documentation. By bypassing authentication mechanisms for these specific routes, the device fails to enforce basic access control principles, effectively treating internal management interfaces as public resources accessible to any network participant with connectivity to the target host.
From a technical perspective, this issue stems from an incomplete implementation of security middleware or route protection rules within the application framework. Instead of applying authentication checks globally and selectively disabling them only for explicitly defined public endpoints such as health checks or static assets, the configuration inadvertently omits critical administrative and diagnostic routes. This oversight results in information disclosure where sensitive operational metadata is returned to unauthenticated requests. The exposure of MQTT usernames and configuration file listings is particularly severe as it reveals internal communication protocols and structural details that can be leveraged for further exploitation. Similarly, exposing firmware versions allows attackers to identify known vulnerabilities associated with specific software releases, while system logs may contain additional credentials or network topology information.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple data leakage into facilitating sophisticated reconnaissance activities. An attacker can use the retrieved API documentation and configuration listings to map out the device's capabilities and internal structure without triggering intrusion detection systems that monitor for authentication failures. The availability of serial numbers and firmware versions enables targeted attacks by allowing adversaries to select exploits specific to the installed software version. Furthermore, knowledge of MQTT usernames facilitates potential brute-force attacks or credential stuffing attempts against the messaging protocol used for device communication. This level of information disclosure significantly lowers the barrier for entry, transforming a passive network position into an active threat vector capable of leading to full system compromise if combined with other vulnerabilities such as weak authentication mechanisms or unpatched software flaws.
This vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-200: Information Exposure and CWE-862: Missing Authorization, as it involves the unauthorized access to sensitive information due to a failure in enforcing access controls. In terms of the MITRE ATT&CK framework for IoT devices, this behavior corresponds to T1592: Gather Victim Host Information and T1590: Gather Victim Network Information, where adversaries collect data about networked systems to support subsequent phases of an attack campaign. The exposure of API documentation also relates to T1608: Install Tool, as it provides attackers with the necessary interface specifications to craft malicious requests or develop custom exploitation tools tailored specifically for this device model.
To mitigate this risk, vendors have implemented a comprehensive fix in version 1.6.0 that enforces strict authentication requirements across all API routes. This change ensures that every endpoint requires an authenticated role before returning any data, effectively closing the unauthorized access vector. Additionally, the interactive API documentation has been disabled for unauthenticated users to prevent attackers from easily discovering available endpoints and their parameters. The serial number is also withheld from anonymous callers, reducing the amount of identifiable information exposed during initial reconnaissance phases. Organizations relying on affected devices should immediately upgrade to version 1.6.0 or later. In environments where upgrading is not immediately feasible, network segmentation strategies can be employed to restrict access to these API endpoints exclusively to trusted management subnets, and firewall rules should be configured to block external access to the device's administrative interfaces. Regular security audits of web application configurations are recommended to ensure that authentication middleware is applied consistently across all service routes.