CVE-2026-77296 in MyMangaDBinfo

Summary

by MITRE • 11/18/2026

MyMangaDB is a self-hosted manga collection manager with automatic metadata, MyAnimeList import, Docker support, and collection statistics. Prior to 2.7.2, the unauthenticated /api/v1/images/manga/save handler in backend/app/api/v1/endpoints/image.py accepts a client-controlled filename and joins it to IMAGE_SAVE_PATH without confining the result. Traversal sequences can escape the image directory and overwrite process-writable files, including DATABASE_PATH for the live SQLite database, while the client-supplied image content type does not validate the uploaded bytes. An attacker can replace the database to plant an administrative user and can overwrite other writable files, causing full application compromise and availability loss. This issue is fixed in version 2.7.2.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 11/19/2026

The vulnerability identified in MyMangaDB versions prior to 2.7.2 represents a critical path traversal flaw within the backend API endpoint responsible for handling image uploads. Specifically, the unauthenticated handler located at /api/v1/images/manga/save fails to properly sanitize or validate client-supplied filenames before processing them. This lack of input validation allows an attacker to manipulate the filename parameter using directory traversal sequences, such as ../, which are then joined with the application's designated IMAGE_SAVE_PATH without any subsequent confinement checks. The core technical failure lies in the absence of a mechanism to ensure that the resulting file path remains strictly within the intended image storage directory, thereby violating the principle of least privilege and secure default configurations for file system operations.

From an operational perspective, this flaw enables severe consequences including arbitrary file write capabilities and potential remote code execution or administrative takeover. By exploiting the traversal sequence, a malicious actor can escape the sandboxed image directory and overwrite files located in other parts of the filesystem that are writable by the application process. A particularly critical target is the DATABASE_PATH, which points to the live SQLite database used for storing user credentials and collection metadata. An attacker can replace this database file with one containing pre-configured administrative accounts, effectively bypassing authentication mechanisms entirely. This action grants full control over the application, allowing the adversary to manipulate all data managed by MyMangaDB, including manga collections, reading lists, and personal statistics.

Beyond database manipulation, the vulnerability extends to availability impacts through denial of service scenarios. Since the handler does not validate the content type or structure of the uploaded bytes beyond basic acceptance, an attacker can upload malformed or excessively large files that corrupt other writable process files. This capability disrupts normal application functionality, leading to service outages and loss of data integrity for legitimate users. The combination of unauthenticated access and unrestricted file write operations creates a high-severity risk profile where system compromise does not require prior authentication credentials, significantly lowering the barrier to entry for attackers seeking to exploit this weakness in deployed instances.

This vulnerability aligns with CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory, which describes flaws where software uses external input to construct file paths without ensuring that those paths remain within intended boundaries. Additionally, it relates to CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type, as the application fails to restrict the types of files or content that can be uploaded and processed. In terms of offensive security frameworks, this exploit maps to ATT&CK technique T1505.003: Web Shell: ASPX, although in this specific context, it is more accurately categorized under file manipulation techniques like T1222.002: File and Directory Permissions Modification for Linux or Unix Systems, as the primary impact involves overwriting critical configuration and data files rather than executing code directly through a web shell mechanism.

Mitigation strategies primarily involve upgrading to version 2.7.2 of MyMangaDB, where these issues have been addressed by implementing strict path validation and confinement checks. For environments that cannot immediately upgrade, administrators should ensure the application runs with minimal file system permissions, restricting write access only to necessary directories and preventing writes to critical configuration or database files. Implementing a reverse proxy in front of the application can also help by filtering out suspicious filename patterns containing traversal sequences before they reach the backend handler. Furthermore, enabling comprehensive logging for API endpoints allows security teams to monitor for repeated attempts at path manipulation, facilitating rapid detection and response to exploitation efforts targeting this specific vulnerability vector.

Responsible

GitHub M

Reservation

08/20/2026

Disclosure

11/18/2026

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00334

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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