CVE-2026-77312 in flyto-core
Summary
by MITRE • 11/20/2026
Flyto2 Core is an execution kernel for automation and AI-agent workflows. Prior to 2.26.8, the earlier CVE-2026-67429 remediation applied validate_path_with_env_config() to only a hand-picked set of file-writing modules, leaving data.csv.write in src/core/modules/atomic/data/csv_write.py, data.json_to_csv in src/core/modules/atomic/data/json_to_csv.py, file.copy in src/core/modules/atomic/file/copy.py, and file.move in src/core/modules/atomic/file/move.py outside the FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR confinement boundary. The advisory also identifies unguarded modules across the broader data.*, file.*, and report-writer families. data.csv.write relies on a .. substring denylist that does not reject absolute paths, while the other named modules accept caller-controlled output or destination paths without the canonical guard. A caller able to execute modules or recipes can therefore write attacker-controlled content outside the configured sandbox, potentially overwriting application code, recipes, startup files, scheduled-task files, or authorization files and gaining code execution on the host. This issue is fixed in version 2.26.8.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/20/2026
Flyto2 Core serves as an execution kernel designed to orchestrate automation tasks and artificial intelligence agent workflows within a controlled environment. The security architecture relies heavily on confinement boundaries, specifically the FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR, which is intended to restrict file system operations to a designated safe directory. This isolation mechanism is critical for preventing malicious or erroneous actions from affecting the host operating system's integrity, configuration files, and other sensitive data stores that lie outside the sandbox perimeter.
A significant vulnerability was identified in versions prior to 2.26.8 due to an incomplete remediation of CVE-2026-67429. The previous security fix applied a validation function named validate_path_with_env_config() only to a limited subset of file-writing modules, inadvertently leaving several critical components unguarded. Specifically, the data.csv.write module located in src/core/modules/atomic/data/csv_write.py, the data.json_to_csv module in src/core/modules/atomic/data/json_to_csv.py, and the file.copy and file.move operations found in src/core/modules/atomic/file/copy.py and move.py respectively were not subjected to this path validation logic. This oversight created a gap in the defense-in-depth strategy, allowing these specific modules to operate without proper confinement checks.
The technical flaw manifests through inadequate input sanitization of destination paths provided by callers executing modules or recipes. The data.csv.write module attempts to mitigate risks using a denylist approach that blocks strings containing double dots (..), which is commonly used for directory traversal attacks. However, this method fails to reject absolute file paths, such as /etc/passwd or C:\Windows\System32\config\SAM, allowing an attacker to specify locations entirely outside the sandbox boundary. The other identified modules accept caller-controlled output or destination paths without any canonical path validation or confinement guard, further exacerbating the risk of unauthorized file system access.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, as it enables a local privilege escalation scenario where code execution on the host machine can be achieved through arbitrary file writes. An attacker who has the ability to execute modules or recipes within Flyto2 Core can write malicious content to critical system locations. This capability allows for the overwriting of application source code, recipe definitions, startup scripts, scheduled-task configurations, and authorization files. By manipulating these files, an adversary can establish persistence, escalate privileges, or achieve remote code execution on the underlying host operating system, effectively breaking out of the intended sandbox isolation.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (Path Traversal) and CWE-732: Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource, as it involves failing to restrict file operations to an expected directory context due to flawed permission or path validation logic. From the perspective of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, this flaw facilitates techniques related to Defense Evasion by allowing attackers to bypass sandbox restrictions and Execution via Command Scripting Interpreter if malicious scripts are written to startup locations. It also touches upon Persistence mechanisms through the modification of scheduled tasks or system configuration files.
The issue has been addressed in version 2.26.8, which implements comprehensive path validation across all affected modules including data., file., and report-writer families. To mitigate this risk in environments still running older versions, it is imperative to upgrade Flyto2 Core immediately upon availability of the patched release. Until then, administrators should restrict module execution privileges to trusted users only and monitor for unusual file system activity outside the designated sandbox directory. Implementing strict allow-lists for destination paths rather than relying on denylists or simple substring checks would provide a more robust defense against path traversal attacks in future development cycles.