CVE-2026-77382 in falcon-rustinfo

Summary

by MITRE • 11/20/2026

falcon-rust is a Rust implementation of the Falcon post-quantum signature scheme. Prior to 0.2.0, the discrete-Gaussian sampler in src/samplerz.rs evaluates approx_exp, ber_exp, and sampler_z acceptance probabilities with FixedPoint64 values having only 32 fractional bits. The scaling in approx_exp quantizes its input and limits relative precision to about 2^-33, below Falcon's required bound, causing reference known-answer vectors to diverge and invalidating the proof assumption that secret-dependent signature and key distributions are negligibly close to the ideal discrete Gaussian. This is a cryptographic-soundness defect and no practical key-recovery attack has been demonstrated. This issue is fixed in version 0.2.0.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 11/20/2026

The vulnerability identified within the falcon-rust library, specifically prior to version 0.2.0, represents a critical cryptographic soundness defect rooted in insufficient numerical precision during the discrete Gaussian sampling process. Falcon is a post-quantum signature scheme based on lattice cryptography, relying heavily on precise mathematical operations to ensure security against quantum computing attacks. The core of this vulnerability lies in the implementation of the sampler_z module, which utilizes FixedPoint64 values for calculating acceptance probabilities related approx_exp and ber_exp functions. These fixed-point representations were configured with only 32 fractional bits, a constraint that fundamentally limits the relative precision of these calculations to approximately 2^-33. This level of precision falls below the stringent bounds required by the Falcon specification to maintain cryptographic integrity.

The operational impact of this imprecision is significant for the theoretical security guarantees of the signature scheme. The discrete Gaussian distribution is central to lattice-based cryptography, as it ensures that secret keys and signatures are distributed in a manner that hides information about the private key from potential attackers. By quantizing inputs with insufficient precision, the sampler introduces deviations from the ideal discrete Gaussian distribution. This deviation causes reference known-answer vectors to diverge from expected values, indicating that the implementation does not strictly adhere to the mathematical model upon which its security proofs are built. Consequently, the proof assumption that secret-dependent signature and key distributions remain negligibly close to the ideal is invalidated in this specific implementation context.

From a threat modeling perspective, while no practical key-recovery attack has been demonstrated against this flaw, the deviation from theoretical bounds poses a latent risk. In cryptographic systems, even small statistical biases can potentially be exploited over time or under specific conditions by sophisticated adversaries. The vulnerability aligns with CWE-697, which concerns incorrect comparison results due to floating-point precision issues, and more broadly relates to CWE-354 regarding improper validation of consistency within the algorithmic logic. Furthermore, it impacts the integrity aspect of security as defined in standard frameworks, potentially affecting the reliability of digital signatures generated by affected versions. The ATT&CK framework does not have a direct technique for this specific implementation flaw, but it falls under the broader category of software vulnerabilities that can lead to compromise if combined with other factors or future cryptanalytic advances.

To mitigate this risk, organizations and developers utilizing falcon-rust must immediately upgrade to version 0.2.0 or later, where the precision issues in the discrete Gaussian sampler have been resolved. This update ensures that the fixed-point arithmetic meets the required precision thresholds, thereby restoring compliance with Falcon's security proofs. For systems already deployed with vulnerable versions, it is advisable to assess whether any signatures generated during the period of vulnerability need re-signing if high assurance is required. Additionally, developers should implement rigorous unit testing against known-answer vectors to detect similar numerical discrepancies in other cryptographic implementations. Regular audits of third-party cryptographic libraries are essential to maintain robust security postures in an environment increasingly threatened by quantum computing capabilities.

Responsible

GitHub M

Reservation

08/20/2026

Disclosure

11/20/2026

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00274

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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