CVE-2026-77875 in Hide Photos
Summary
by MITRE • 09/19/2026
The application protects access through its calculator-style vault passcode, but the stored data is not bound to that authentication boundary. A local actor who can access shared external storage, such as through an authorized non-root ADB shell or another local file-reading context with suitable storage access, can copy the SQLite database and media files directly without entering the vault passcode.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/19/2026
The vulnerability described represents a critical failure in data isolation mechanisms within mobile application security architecture. Specifically, it involves an improper binding of sensitive cryptographic assets to their authentication gatekeeper. While the user interface presents a calculator-style vault that requires a passcode for access, this protection is purely superficial at the storage layer. The underlying SQLite database containing encrypted or potentially plaintext records, along with associated media files, resides in a location accessible via standard Android shared external storage paths rather than being confined to an application-specific private directory protected by operating system-level permissions. This architectural flaw means that the security boundary defined by the passcode does not extend to the physical persistence of the data itself.
From a technical perspective, this issue stems from storing sensitive user data in world-readable or group-writable directories on external storage media. In Android environments, applications often default to using public shared storage for convenience, but fail to implement additional encryption at rest or restrict file permissions appropriately when handling high-sensitivity content like vaulted documents and images. The presence of the SQLite database and media files in these accessible locations allows any process with read access to those directories to bypass the application's internal authentication logic entirely. This is particularly dangerous because it undermines the fundamental principle that data confidentiality must be maintained regardless of whether the user interface controls are engaged or not.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe for users relying on the vault for privacy-sensitive information. A local actor with physical access to the device, or a malicious application installed on the same system, can exploit this flaw by utilizing tools such as Android Debug Bridge (ADB) in an authorized non-root shell context. By navigating to the exposed storage path and copying the database file, the attacker gains immediate access to all vaulted content without needing to guess or crack the passcode. This effectively renders the encryption or obfuscation provided by the app's UI layer meaningless if the data at rest is not independently secured against unauthorized read operations from other processes on the device.
This flaw aligns with CWE-284, which describes Improper Access Control, as well as CWE-359 regarding Exposure of Private Information to an Unauthorized Actor. Furthermore, in the context of the MITRE ATT&CK framework for mobile platforms, this behavior facilitates techniques related to Data from Local System and potentially Credential Dumping if passwords or tokens are stored within the database without proper key management isolation. The vulnerability highlights a common pitfall where developers prioritize user experience by placing files in easily accessible locations but neglect to enforce strict file system permissions or implement transparent data encryption that is independent of application state.
Mitigation strategies must focus on enforcing stricter access controls at both the operating system and application levels. Developers should migrate sensitive SQLite databases and media files from shared external storage to the app's private internal storage directory, which is automatically protected by Android's sandboxing mechanisms and inaccessible to other applications without root privileges or specific permission grants that are rarely available in standard contexts. Additionally, implementing strong encryption at rest using keys derived from user credentials stored securely within a hardware-backed keystore can ensure that even if file access were somehow obtained, the data remains unintelligible without proper authentication. Regular security audits and static code analysis tools should be employed to detect improper storage paths for sensitive assets before deployment.