CVE-2026-77968 in Apache Camel
Summary
by MITRE • 09/08/2026
A flaw was found in hawtio-operator. The operator's ClusterRole grants secrets: [create, get, list, update, watch] across all namespaces. While the operator uses a controller-runtime label-selector cache as a memory optimization, the ServiceAccount token authorizes read access to every Secret in the cluster. The operator also bypasses the cache via direct API calls. Compromise of the operator pod would yield read access to every Secret in the cluster, including bootstrap tokens, cloud credentials, and other operators' secrets.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/08/2026
The vulnerability identified within the hawtio-operator represents a critical misconfiguration of Kubernetes RBAC permissions that results in excessive privilege escalation potential for any entity gaining control over the operator pod. The core technical flaw lies in the ClusterRole assigned to the service account associated with this operator, which explicitly grants read access verbs including create, get, list, update, and watch on secrets across all namespaces. In a standard Kubernetes environment, RBAC policies are designed to enforce least privilege principles by restricting resource access to specific scopes or namespaces unless absolutely necessary for operational functionality. By granting cluster-wide secret visibility, the operator violates these fundamental security boundaries, effectively transforming a namespace-scoped workload into a tool capable of enumerating and extracting sensitive credentials from every part of the cluster infrastructure.
The severity of this vulnerability is compounded by how the operator interacts with the Kubernetes API server in relation to its caching mechanisms. While the operator utilizes controller-runtime label-selector caches as an optimization strategy for memory usage, it simultaneously bypasses these local caches through direct API calls when retrieving secret data. This architectural choice means that even if a defender were to attempt to mitigate exposure by restricting cache access or monitoring cached objects, the direct API interactions remain fully authorized and visible in audit logs but unrestricted in scope. The combination of broad RBAC permissions and direct API retrieval ensures that any compromise of the operator pod allows an attacker to programmatically iterate through all namespaces and extract every secret stored within them without encountering permission denials.
The operational impact of this flaw is severe, as it provides a comprehensive view of the cluster's most sensitive assets. Secrets in Kubernetes typically contain bootstrap tokens required for node joining, cloud provider credentials such as AWS IAM keys or Azure service principal secrets, database passwords, TLS certificates, and internal communication keys used by other operators and applications. An attacker who compromises the hawtio-operator pod can leverage these extracted secrets to pivot laterally across the cluster, authenticate against external cloud services using stolen infrastructure credentials, or decrypt sensitive data stored in persistent volumes. This level of access effectively grants administrative control over both the Kubernetes environment and any connected external systems that rely on those compromised credentials for authentication.
From a threat modeling perspective aligned with industry standards, this vulnerability maps directly to CWE-269 Improper Privilege Management due to overly permissive role-based access controls. Furthermore, in the context of the MITRE ATT&CK framework for Kubernetes, this behavior aligns with T1508 Exploitation of Remote Services and specifically facilitates techniques related to Credential Access such as Steal or Forge Service Account Tokens (T1528) and Cloud Instance Metadata API Queries if combined with other vectors. The ability to list and get secrets across all namespaces is a precursor to broader cluster takeover, allowing attackers to harvest service account tokens that may have even higher privileges than the operator itself.
Mitigation strategies must focus on immediately restricting the RBAC permissions assigned to the hawtio-operator's service account. Administrators should replace the ClusterRole with a namespace-scoped Role or a more restrictive ClusterRole that limits secret access only to specific namespaces where the operator actually requires them, rather than granting wildcard access across all namespaces. Additionally, implementing network policies can help restrict outbound API calls from the pod if possible, though RBAC is the primary control point here. It is also recommended to audit existing service accounts for similar over-permission patterns and rotate any secrets that may have been exposed or are at risk of exposure due to this vulnerability. Regular review of operator permissions against their actual operational requirements will prevent such privilege creep in future deployments.