CVE-2026-79654 in Satellite
Summary
by MITRE • 08/26/2026
A flaw was found in Katello where the Content View History API does not properly enforce authorization when accessing a Content View specified by the user. An authenticated user with permission to view Content Views in one organization may be able to access the lifecycle history of a Content View belonging to another organization by supplying its identifier to the affected API endpoint. This can result in unauthorized disclosure of Content View lifecycle information, including publication and promotion events, associated users, and timestamps.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/26/2026
The vulnerability identified within Katello represents a critical failure in access control mechanisms governing the Content View History API. In enterprise content management systems like Katello, which is built on top of Red Hat Satellite, data isolation between organizations is a fundamental security requirement to ensure that sensitive software distribution strategies and lifecycle events remain confidential. The flaw stems from an improper enforcement of authorization checks when processing requests for Content View history. Specifically, the application logic fails to verify whether the authenticated user requesting access to a specific Content View identifier possesses the necessary permissions within the organization associated with that view. Instead of validating the relationship between the user's organizational context and the target resource, the system relies solely on the provided identifier, allowing any authenticated user who can list or view content views in their own organization to potentially query history data for resources belonging to other organizations by simply supplying a valid Content View ID from those external contexts.
This authorization bypass leads directly to an unauthorized disclosure of sensitive operational intelligence. The exposed information includes detailed lifecycle events such as publication and promotion activities, which reveal the timing and nature of software updates deployed across infrastructure. Furthermore, the leak encompasses associated user identities and precise timestamps, providing attackers with a comprehensive audit trail of administrative actions. This level of detail can be leveraged by malicious actors to map out an organization's update cycles, identify key personnel involved in system administration, and understand the deployment patterns that might indicate periods of vulnerability or maintenance windows where security controls may be temporarily relaxed. The exposure undermines the principle of least privilege and compromises the integrity of multi-tenant environments where strict separation of duties is required.
From a classification perspective, this flaw aligns with CWE-284 Improper Access Control, as it involves a failure to restrict access to resources based on user roles or organizational boundaries. It also maps to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078 Valid Accounts, specifically the aspect of using legitimate credentials to access unauthorized data within an application environment. The vulnerability allows for information gathering that can facilitate further attacks, such as social engineering against identified administrators or targeted exploitation during known maintenance windows revealed by the timestamped history logs.
Mitigation strategies must focus on strengthening server-side validation logic. Developers should ensure that every API endpoint performing resource retrieval explicitly checks not only if the user has permission to view content views generally but also verifies that the specific Content View being accessed belongs to an organization for which the user holds appropriate viewing rights. Implementing robust object-level authorization checks is essential, ensuring that the context of the request matches the permissions granted to the session. Additionally, applying principle of least privilege by restricting API access to only those users who strictly require it can reduce the attack surface. Regular security audits and penetration testing focused on cross-tenant data leakage are recommended to detect similar flaws in other parts of the application before they can be exploited in production environments.