CVE-2026-79957 in ServiceNext
Summary
by MITRE • 10/14/2026
ServiceNext contains an insecure direct object reference (IDOR) in the /api/Usuario/GetUsuarios endpoint, which accepts a user-controlled numeric ID in the request body without verifying that the authenticated token belongs to the requested account (CWE-639). Any authenticated user can iterate the ID parameter to retrieve the full profile record of every other user, including passwords stored in cleartext (CWE-256), enabling account takeover and credential-stuffing attacks.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/14/2026
ServiceNext suffers from a critical insecure direct object reference vulnerability within its /api/Usuario/GetUsuarios endpoint, classified under CWE-639. This architectural flaw stems from the application's failure to enforce proper authorization checks when processing requests that contain user-controlled numeric identifiers in the request body. Instead of validating whether the authenticated session token corresponds to the specific account being queried or possesses administrative privileges to access other accounts, the server blindly trusts the provided ID parameter and returns the associated data. This lack of object-level permission verification allows any authenticated user to manipulate the input value sequentially, effectively bypassing access controls that should restrict visibility to only their own profile information.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to the nature of the data exposed during these unauthorized queries. By iterating through sequential numeric IDs, an attacker can enumerate and retrieve complete profile records for all users within the system. Crucially, the response includes sensitive authentication material, specifically passwords stored in cleartext as noted under CWE-256. The storage of plaintext credentials represents a fundamental security failure that compounds the risk posed by the IDOR flaw. Once an attacker obtains these clear-text passwords, they can immediately compromise individual accounts without needing to perform complex cracking or hashing operations.
This combination of unauthorized data access and exposed cleartext credentials creates a direct pathway for account takeover attacks. Attackers can leverage the harvested credentials in credential-stuffing campaigns against ServiceNext itself or attempt lateral movement by reusing these passwords on other platforms where users may have employed identical authentication details, exploiting common password reuse behaviors across different services. The ability to systematically harvest user data and corresponding plaintext secrets undermines the confidentiality integrity of the entire application ecosystem, potentially leading to broader organizational compromise if internal tools rely on ServiceNext for identity management or single sign-on integration.
To mitigate this vulnerability, immediate remediation is required at both the code level and infrastructure configuration layers. Developers must implement strict object-level authorization checks within the /api/Usuario/GetUsuarios endpoint logic, ensuring that every request verifies the authenticated user's identity against the requested resource ID before returning any data. If a user attempts to access another user's profile without explicit administrative rights, the server should return an appropriate HTTP 403 Forbidden response rather than leaking information. Additionally, it is imperative to rectify the underlying credential storage mechanism by migrating from cleartext storage to a robust hashing algorithm such as bcrypt or Argon2 with unique salts, thereby neutralizing the value of any stolen password hashes and aligning with industry best practices for secure authentication data handling.