CVE-2026-80424 in DataStage on Cloud Pak for Data
Summary
by MITRE • 09/10/2026
IBM DataStage on Cloud Pak for Data 5.4.0.0 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to create arbitrary files due to path traversal during archive extraction.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/10/2026
The vulnerability identified in IBM DataStage within the Cloud Pak for Data environment, specifically affecting version 5.4.0.0, represents a critical security flaw rooted in improper input validation during file handling operations. This issue is classified as a Path Traversal vulnerability, which falls under the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) category CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory. The core technical deficiency lies in the application's archive extraction mechanism, where user-supplied filenames or paths contained within uploaded archives are not sufficiently sanitized before being written to the file system. When an authenticated attacker submits a maliciously crafted archive containing files with directory traversal sequences such as dot-dot-slash (../), the underlying software fails to restrict these operations to the intended target directory. Consequently, the extraction process resolves these relative path components and writes the extracted content to arbitrary locations on the host operating system's file hierarchy, bypassing the expected sandbox or application-specific directories.
From an operational perspective, this vulnerability allows a remote authenticated attacker to achieve unauthorized write access to sensitive areas of the server hosting IBM DataStage. The impact extends beyond simple data corruption; it enables the placement of malicious scripts, web shells, or configuration files in locations that may be executed by system services or accessed by other privileged processes. For instance, if an attacker can overwrite a startup script or inject code into a directory monitored by a process manager like systemd or supervisord, they could achieve remote code execution with the privileges associated with those services. This effectively compromises the integrity of the entire Cloud Pak for Data environment, as IBM DataStage often runs with elevated permissions to manage data pipelines and interact with various backend systems. The ability to create arbitrary files also facilitates persistence mechanisms, allowing attackers to maintain access even after initial detection or partial remediation efforts.
This vulnerability aligns with several tactics in the MITRE ATT&CK framework, particularly those related to Defense Evasion and Persistence. Specifically, it relates to T1036: Masquerading, where malicious files are disguised as legitimate system artifacts by placing them in trusted directories. It also connects to T1505.002: Web Shell, if the attacker uploads executable code that can be triggered via a web interface or service endpoint. Furthermore, the act of writing outside restricted boundaries is indicative of T1611: Escape to Host, where an adversary breaks out of a containerized or sandboxed environment by exploiting file system access controls. The authentication requirement means this vulnerability cannot be exploited anonymously; however, since it targets authenticated users, any compromised user account with sufficient privileges to upload archives becomes a viable entry point for attackers to escalate their position within the infrastructure.
Mitigation strategies must address both immediate remediation and long-term architectural improvements. The primary defense is applying the vendor-provided security patch or updating IBM DataStage on Cloud Pak for Data to a version where this path traversal flaw has been resolved through rigorous input validation and canonicalization of file paths before extraction. Administrators should ensure that all software components within the Kubernetes cluster are up-to-date with the latest security fixes provided by Red Hat and IBM. In addition to patching, defense-in-depth measures should be implemented. This includes configuring container runtimes with strict filesystem permissions using read-only root filesystems where possible, limiting write access to specific volumes only when necessary for application functionality. Network segmentation policies should restrict outbound connections from the DataStage pods to minimize lateral movement potential if an exploit is successful. Furthermore, implementing robust logging and monitoring solutions that detect unusual file creation patterns or unexpected path traversal attempts can aid in early detection of exploitation activities. Regular audits of uploaded content types and sizes also help reduce the attack surface associated with archive processing features.