CVE-2026-81505 in Convoy
Summary
by MITRE • 09/18/2026
Convoy is a cloud native webhooks gateway. Prior to 26.6.8, Convoy's GET /api/v1/projects/{projectID}/sources/{sourceID} endpoint authorizes access to the project in the URL, but Handler.GetSource calls sources.Service.FindSourceByID() and fetches the Source only by sourceID without confirming that its ProjectID matches the authorized project. An authenticated user or project-scoped API key holder can substitute another tenant's Source identifier and receive that Source's complete record, including unredacted AMQP, Kafka, SQS, or Google PubSub credentials. The list endpoint remains project-scoped; the single-item Source lookup is affected. This issue is fixed in version 26.6.8.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/18/2026
The vulnerability identified as a broken access control flaw within Convoy, specifically affecting versions prior to 26.6.8, stems from an inconsistency between URL-based authorization and backend data retrieval logic. The application utilizes a RESTful API structure where the GET /api/v1/projects/{projectID}/sources/{sourceID} endpoint is designed to enforce project-level scoping through the path parameters. However, the underlying implementation in the Handler.GetSource function relies exclusively on sources.Service.FindSourceByID(), which queries the database using only the source identifier provided in the request. This architectural oversight means that while the initial routing or middleware may validate that a user has access to the specified projectID, the actual data fetch operation does not cross-reference this authorization context with the ProjectID associated with the requested Source record. Consequently, an attacker who possesses valid authentication credentials for one tenant can manipulate the sourceID parameter in the URL to request details belonging to a different tenant's infrastructure configuration.
This technical flaw results in a severe information disclosure vulnerability that allows authenticated users or holders of project-scoped API keys to bypass intended isolation boundaries between tenants. By substituting a target source identifier, an attacker can retrieve complete records for sources they do not own. The impact is particularly critical because these records contain unredacted sensitive credentials required for webhook delivery mechanisms, including AMQP connection strings, Kafka configuration details, SQS queue URLs and access keys, or Google PubSub service account tokens. In a multi-tenant SaaS environment where Convoy operates as a cloud-native webhooks gateway, such exposure compromises the confidentiality of third-party integrations and could facilitate further attacks against external services if these credentials are exploited by malicious actors who gain unauthorized access to them.
From an industry standards perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-639, which describes Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, as well as CWE-284, indicating Improper Access Control. The exploitation technique maps directly to the MITRE ATT&CK framework under T1078, specifically Valid Accounts and potentially T1530 if used for data exfiltration from cloud storage or services configured via these credentials. The root cause is a failure in server-side validation where the application trusts client-supplied identifiers without verifying their association with the authenticated session's authorized scope. This type of logic error is common in applications that rely heavily on URL parameters for authorization checks while neglecting to enforce those same constraints during database queries or service layer operations.
To mitigate this vulnerability, organizations running Convoy must upgrade immediately to version 26.6.8 where the issue has been resolved by ensuring that source lookups are strictly bound to the authorized project context. For environments unable to patch instantly, defensive measures should include implementing strict input validation on all API endpoints and enforcing multi-factor authorization checks within service layer methods rather than relying solely on URL structure or middleware-level permissions. Additionally, auditing database queries for implicit trust in client-supplied identifiers is essential to prevent similar bypasses across other endpoints. Regular security assessments focusing on object level access control patterns can help identify such discrepancies before they are exploited in production environments.