CVE-2026-82253 in gitoxide
Summary
by MITRE • 08/28/2026
gitoxide (Rust crates gix <= 0.72.0 and gix-validate <= 0.10.0) contains a path traversal vulnerability. The submodule name validation function in gix-validate only checks the first occurrence of '..' via name.find(b".."), allowing crafted names such as 'a..b/../../../.git/' to bypass the check; additionally this validation is never invoked in production code paths. Combined with a trust inheritance flaw in Submodule::open(), where the parent repository's git_dir_trust (Trust::Full) is cloned and the ownership verification is skipped, an attacker can craft a malicious .gitmodules file so that a victim tool built on gitoxide reads arbitrary git repository configuration (including embedded credentials) with full trust, bypassing safe-directory protections. Fixed in gix 0.82.0 and gix-validate 0.11.1.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/28/2026
The vulnerability identified within the gitoxide Rust crates, specifically affecting versions of gix up to 0.72.0 and gix-validate up to 0.10.0, represents a critical path traversal flaw combined with a trust inheritance error that compromises repository integrity and security boundaries. This issue stems from an insufficient validation mechanism in the submodule name processing logic where the system fails to adequately sanitize input strings containing directory traversal sequences. The core technical deficiency lies in the implementation of the submodule name validation function within gix-validate, which relies on a simplistic check for the first occurrence of double dots using the find operation. This approach is fundamentally flawed because it does not account for encoded or nested traversal patterns that can bypass such superficial checks. For instance, an attacker can construct malicious submodule names like 'a..b/../../../.git/' which contain multiple levels of directory climbing but only trigger a single detection event in the naive validation logic, allowing the path to proceed as if it were safe.
Beyond the immediate input validation failure, the vulnerability is exacerbated by a trust inheritance flaw inherent in the Submodule::open() function. When opening a submodule, the code clones the parent repository's git_dir_trust status, typically setting it to Trust::Full without performing adequate ownership verification or context isolation checks. This means that even if the path traversal were partially mitigated, the resulting access would still be granted full trust privileges equivalent to those of the parent repository. The combination of these two flaws creates a severe security gap where an attacker can craft a malicious .gitmodules file designed to trick tools built on gitoxide into reading arbitrary files from the filesystem with elevated permissions. This effectively bypasses safe-directory protections that are intended to prevent accidental or malicious execution of code and configuration from untrusted sources, leading to potential unauthorized access sensitive repository configurations including embedded credentials such as API keys, passwords, or private tokens stored in Git config files.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant for any developer or automated system utilizing gitoxide to clone repositories containing submodules with crafted entries. An attacker who can influence the content of a .gitmodules file, whether through social engineering, compromised upstream projects, or malicious repository injection, can force the victim tool to read sensitive data from arbitrary locations on the host machine's filesystem. This could lead to credential theft, information disclosure, and potentially further exploitation if the retrieved configuration files contain secrets that grant access to other systems or services. The fact that this validation is never invoked in production code paths for certain scenarios means that many users may be exposed without any warning or error message, making detection difficult through standard logging mechanisms alone.
To mitigate these risks, immediate updates are required as the issue has been addressed in gix version 0.82.0 and gix-validate version 0.11.1. Users should upgrade their dependencies to these patched versions which implement stricter path normalization and validation logic that correctly handles all instances of directory traversal sequences rather than just the first one. Additionally, developers integrating gitoxide into their applications should review their submodule handling code to ensure they are not relying on default trust inheritance without explicit verification steps. It is also recommended to enforce strict allowlists for allowed paths when processing submodules and to avoid trusting repository configurations from unverified sources unless explicitly required by secure workflows. From a classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory regarding the path traversal aspect and CWE-937 Use of Broken Trust Boundaries related to the trust inheritance flaw in submodule opening operations. In terms of attack vectors, it relates to ATT&CK technique T1506 Post-exploitation Data Staging or more specifically data exfiltration via local file access if combined with other vulnerabilities, though primarily here it serves as a mechanism for unauthorized configuration reading which falls under initial access or privilege escalation depending on the context.