CVE-2026-82277 in argo-rollouts
Summary
by MITRE • 08/28/2026
Argo Rollouts dashboard through 1.10.0 binds to all interfaces and exposes mutating Rollout operations without authentication, authorization, or CSRF protection. Attackers on the same network can invoke PromoteRollout, AbortRollout, RestartRollout, SetRolloutImage, UndoRollout, and RetryRollout operations across all namespaces accessible to the operator's kubeconfig.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/28/2026
The vulnerability in Argo Rollouts dashboard versions through 1.10.0 represents a critical misconfiguration of network binding combined with an absence of essential security controls for administrative interfaces. The core technical flaw lies in the default behavior where the web-based management console binds to all available network interfaces, specifically zero-zero-zero-zero, rather than restricting access to localhost or specific trusted internal subnets. This configuration choice effectively exposes the dashboard to any device capable of reaching the host machine on the network layer, significantly expanding the attack surface beyond what is typically expected for a cluster-internal tool. By making these endpoints publicly accessible within the local network perimeter, the system fails to implement proper access control boundaries that are standard in secure infrastructure design principles.
Beyond the network exposure issue, the dashboard lacks authentication mechanisms entirely. This means that any user or automated process with network connectivity can interact with the interface without providing credentials. Furthermore, there is no authorization logic implemented to verify if a specific operator has permission to perform actions on particular resources within the Kubernetes cluster. The absence of Cross-Site Request Forgery protections further compounds this risk by allowing malicious actors to craft requests that are executed as if they originated from an authenticated user session, although in this case, since there is no authentication at all, the CSRF aspect primarily serves to facilitate automated exploitation without requiring complex browser-based attack vectors. This combination creates a scenario where unauthenticated remote code execution-like capabilities are available through standard HTTP operations against Kubernetes resources managed by Argo Rollouts.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to the breadth of administrative actions exposed. Attackers on the same network segment can invoke critical lifecycle management functions such as PromoteRollout, AbortRollout, RestartRollout, SetRolloutImage, UndoRollout, and RetryRollout across all namespaces accessible by the operator's kubeconfig context. This allows for arbitrary manipulation of application deployments, potentially leading to service disruption through forced restarts or aborts, unauthorized image updates that could introduce malicious code into production environments via SetRolloutImage, or complete rollback operations that disrupt business continuity. The ability to modify rollouts across all accessible namespaces means a single compromised network position can lead to widespread instability and potential security breaches throughout the entire Kubernetes cluster managed by these operators.
From a classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-284 Improper Access Control as it fails to restrict access to sensitive functionality based on user identity or role. It also maps directly to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078 Valid Accounts if an attacker were able to steal credentials, but more accurately reflects aspects of T1530 Data from Cloud Storage Object Databases in the context of unauthorized data manipulation and configuration changes within cloud-native environments. The lack of authentication specifically relates to CWE-287 Improper Authentication, while the network binding issue touches upon CWE-601 URL Redirection to Untrusted Site via User-supplied URL if considered through the lens of initial access vectors, though primarily it is a misconfiguration leading to unauthorized access.
Mitigation strategies must address both the architectural exposure and the functional security gaps immediately. The most effective remediation involves upgrading Argo Rollouts to version 1.10.1 or later where these defaults have been corrected or hardened. For environments that cannot upgrade immediately, administrators should configure a reverse proxy such as Nginx or Traefik in front of the dashboard to enforce authentication using OAuth2-proxy or similar identity providers and restrict network access via firewall rules to only allow connections from trusted management subnets. Additionally, enabling Kubernetes Role-Based Access Control policies can help limit the scope of actions even if the interface is exposed, although this does not fully mitigate the risk given the lack of initial authentication on the dashboard itself. Regular security audits should include verification that administrative interfaces are never bound to all interfaces and always require strong authentication mechanisms consistent with zero-trust architecture principles.