CVE-2026-82933 in mH-DEVELOPER
Summary
by MITRE • 09/28/2026
mH-DEVELOPER smart home module sends its web interface and API traffic over unencrypted HTTP. Passwords, authentication tokens, and device commands are transmitted in cleartext. An attacker on the same network can intercept this traffic, steal credentials and tokens, and hijack sessions.
This issue was fixed in version 3.0.30
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/28/2026
The mH-DEVELOPER smart home module exhibits a critical security deficiency by transmitting all web interface interactions and application programming interface communications over unencrypted Hypertext Transfer Protocol rather than the secure Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure standard. This architectural oversight results in the transmission of sensitive data, including user passwords, authentication tokens, and device control commands, in cleartext format across the network infrastructure. The absence of encryption means that any party with access to the same local area network segment can utilize passive sniffing tools or active man-in-the-middle techniques to capture these unencrypted packets without detection by standard security controls.
This vulnerability aligns directly with Common Weakness Enumeration identifier CWE-319, which classifies communication over a channel that lacks confidentiality protection as a significant flaw in system design and implementation. Furthermore, the exploitation of this weakness facilitates several malicious activities categorized under MITRE ATT&CK techniques such as T1046 Network Service Discovery for mapping the environment and T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle to intercept traffic between two communicating parties. The lack of transport layer security effectively nullifies any integrity or confidentiality guarantees that might otherwise be provided by higher-level application logic, leaving the entire communication stream vulnerable to eavesdropping and manipulation.
The operational impact of this flaw is severe for both individual consumers and enterprise deployments relying on smart home automation. An attacker positioned within the same network segment can intercept login credentials during authentication processes, thereby gaining unauthorized access to user accounts associated with the device. Additionally, because authentication tokens are also transmitted in plaintext, session hijacking becomes a viable attack vector where an adversary can reuse captured tokens to impersonate legitimate users without needing their passwords. Beyond credential theft, the interception of cleartext device commands allows for potential remote control manipulation, enabling attackers to trigger or disable smart home functions such as locks, cameras, or alarms, which poses direct physical security risks and privacy violations.
To mitigate this vulnerability, it is imperative that all network communications involving sensitive data be encrypted using robust protocols such as TLS with strong cipher suites enabled by default. The vendor has addressed this issue in version 3.0.30 of the mH-DEVELOPER software, which implements proper encryption for both web interface traffic and API calls. Users should immediately update their devices to this patched version to restore confidentiality and integrity protections. In environments where immediate patching is not feasible, network segmentation strategies can be employed to isolate smart home modules from general user networks, reducing the attack surface available to potential interceptors until a permanent fix is applied.