CVE-2026-85427 in essential-moos
Summary
by MITRE • 09/04/2026
MOOS essential-moos pAntler through 10.0.1 contains a remote code execution vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary programs by publishing a crafted MISSION_FILE message to the MOOSDB. Attackers can publish a mission file containing malicious Run entries that pAntler parses and executes via execvp() without authentication validation.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/04/2026
The vulnerability identified in MOOS essential-moos, specifically within the pAntler component through version 10.0.1, represents a critical remote code execution flaw rooted in insufficient input validation and lack of access control mechanisms. The Mission Planner application, known as pAntler, serves as a central interface for defining autonomous behaviors by parsing mission files that contain structured instructions for various MOOS applications. These mission files often include Run entries which instruct the system to launch external programs or scripts when specific conditions are met. In this vulnerable configuration, the parser responsible for processing these MISSION_FILE messages published to the MOOSDB does not perform any authentication checks before executing commands derived from the file content. This architectural oversight allows an unauthenticated attacker who has network access to the MOOS database infrastructure to inject malicious payloads directly into the execution pipeline of the pAntler process.
From a technical perspective, the core flaw lies in how pAntler handles the parsing and subsequent execution of mission directives. When a crafted MISSION_FILE message is published to the central MOOSDB, pAntler retrieves this data and processes its contents without verifying the source or integrity of the file. The vulnerability exploits the system call execvp(), which is used to execute programs specified in the Run entries of the mission file. Because there is no sanitization of the command strings nor any restriction on the types of executables that can be invoked, an attacker can craft a mission file containing arbitrary commands pointing to malicious binaries or scripts located within the execution path of the system. The pAntler process then executes these commands with the same privileges as the user running the MOOS infrastructure, effectively granting full control over the underlying operating system environment where the vulnerability exists.
The operational impact of this remote code execution capability is severe, particularly in environments such as unmanned surface vehicles or underwater robots that rely on MOOS for autonomous navigation and mission planning. An attacker exploiting this flaw can achieve complete compromise of the host machine running pAntler. This includes the ability to install backdoors, exfiltrate sensitive data stored within the vehicle's local storage, modify other mission files to alter future behavior, or disrupt critical operations by terminating essential MOOS applications. In a maritime context, such exploitation could lead to loss of control over the vessel, potential collision with obstacles or other vessels, and significant financial damage due to hardware destruction or recovery costs. The lack of authentication means that any entity on the same network segment as the MOOSDB can potentially exploit this vulnerability without needing valid credentials, significantly lowering the barrier for attack initiation.
This vulnerability aligns closely with Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers such as CWE-94 Improper Control of Generation of Code or Command and CWE-287 Improper Authentication. The failure to validate input before command execution is a classic instance of code injection, while the absence of access control mechanisms for publishing mission files constitutes an authentication bypass at the application logic level. Furthermore, in terms of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, this exploitation technique maps to T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, as it involves executing system commands through legitimate software components, and potentially T1136 Create Account if the attacker creates new user accounts for persistence. The attack vector is classified as Network-based with an Attack Complexity of Low due to the lack of required authentication steps.
Mitigation strategies must focus on implementing strict access controls and input validation within the MOOS infrastructure. Ideally, pAntler should be configured to require authentication before processing any MISSION_FILE messages published to the database. This can be achieved by integrating MOOS with an external authentication service or enabling built-in security features if available in newer versions of essential-moos beyond 10.0.1. Additionally, developers should implement rigorous sanitization routines for all command strings parsed from mission files, ensuring that only whitelisted executables and parameters are allowed to run. Network segmentation is also recommended to restrict access to the MOOSDB to trusted hosts only, thereby reducing the attack surface available to potential adversaries. Upgrading to a patched version of essential-moos where these security controls have been addressed by the maintainers remains the most effective long-term solution for organizations relying on this framework for autonomous operations.