CVE-2026-85426 in MOOS-IvP
Summary
by MITRE • 09/04/2026
MOOS-IvP uMemWatch through 24.8.1 constructs shell commands from attacker-chosen MOOS client names without sanitization. Attackers can inject shell metacharacters into client names to execute arbitrary commands as the uMemWatch process user through unquoted redirection targets in system calls.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/04/2026
The vulnerability identified in MOOS-IvP versions up to 24.8.1 represents a critical command injection flaw within the uMemWatch utility, which is part of the Micro-Ocean Operating System for Unmanned Vehicles framework. This software component is designed to monitor memory usage and report status back to other nodes in the autonomous vehicle network. The core technical deficiency lies in how the application constructs shell commands dynamically based on input received from MOOS clients. Specifically, when a client connects or registers its name with the system, uMemWatch incorporates this identifier directly into command strings that are subsequently passed to operating system shell interpreters for execution. This process involves unquoted redirection targets within system calls, creating an environment where special characters intended by the shell for parsing control flow rather than data content can be exploited by a malicious actor.
The mechanism of exploitation relies on the lack of input sanitization regarding client names. An attacker who has access to the MOOS community or network interface can register a client name containing shell metacharacters such as semicolons, pipes, ampersands, or backticks. Because these characters are not escaped or validated before being embedded into the command string, they alter the structure of the intended system call. For instance, if an attacker registers a client named test; rm -rf /, the resulting shell command might execute the initial part as intended but then proceed to run the injected payload due to the semicolon acting as a command separator. This allows for arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user account running the uMemWatch process, which often requires elevated permissions in embedded or autonomous systems environments to access hardware-level memory statistics and manage resources effectively.
From an operational perspective, this vulnerability poses severe risks to the integrity and availability of unmanned vehicle systems utilizing MOOS-IvP. Successful exploitation could lead to complete compromise of the host system, allowing attackers to install backdoors, exfiltrate sensitive telemetry data, or disrupt critical navigation and control functions by terminating essential processes. In autonomous maritime or aerial applications, such a breach could result in loss of vessel control, physical damage, or safety hazards for surrounding assets. The impact is particularly acute because MOOS-IvP is often deployed in resource-constrained environments where security monitoring tools may be limited, making detection and remediation difficult after an initial compromise has occurred.
This flaw aligns with Common Weakness Enumeration CWE-78 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command, commonly known as OS Command Injection. The vulnerability also maps to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, specifically sub-techniques involving shell commands like sh or bash. Attackers can leverage this entry point for initial access if they have network connectivity to the MOOS community server, followed by privilege escalation depending on the permissions of the uMemWatch process. The lack of input validation is a fundamental design error that violates secure coding principles regarding the separation of code and data when invoking external processes.
Mitigation strategies must focus on strict input validation and safe command execution practices. Developers should implement rigorous sanitization routines for all client names, ensuring that only alphanumeric characters and specific allowed symbols are accepted while rejecting any shell metacharacters or escape sequences. Alternatively, the application architecture should be refactored to avoid using system shells entirely for internal process management. Instead of constructing strings for a shell interpreter, direct API calls such as execve in Unix-like systems can be used with explicit argument arrays, which inherently prevents injection because arguments are treated strictly as data rather than executable code. Additionally, applying the principle of least privilege by running uMemWatch under a restricted user account with minimal permissions can limit the blast radius of any successful exploitation attempt until a permanent patch is deployed.