CVE-2026-9745 in Netezza Software
Summary
by MITRE • 09/03/2026
IBM Netezza Software 11.3.0.3 through Interim Fix 002 has operations that are performed without validating bucket ownership using the ExpectedBucketOwner parameter. This omission may allow a remote attacker to exploit misconfigurations or naming collisions to redirect application requests to an unintended S3 bucket under their control.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/03/2026
The vulnerability identified in IBM Netezza Software versions 11.3.0.3 through Interim Fix 002 represents a critical failure in access control validation within the system's interaction with Amazon Simple Storage Service, commonly known as S3. This flaw is rooted in the omission of mandatory security parameters during API operations that target external storage buckets. Specifically, the software fails to validate bucket ownership by not including or checking the ExpectedBucketOwner parameter when performing actions against S3 endpoints. In standard AWS architecture and best practices for secure cloud integration, this parameter serves as a crucial safeguard to ensure that an application is interacting with its own designated resources rather than inadvertently accessing those belonging to other entities within the same AWS account or organization.
From a technical perspective, this deficiency aligns closely with CWE-284, which describes Improper Access Control, and more specifically relates to CWE-732 in contexts where permission boundaries are not strictly enforced during resource identification. The absence of this validation mechanism means that if an attacker can influence the bucket name or exploit naming collisions within a shared AWS environment, they may trick the Netezza system into directing requests toward buckets under their control. This is particularly dangerous in multi-tenant environments or accounts with multiple teams where distinct S3 buckets are provisioned for different purposes but reside under similar prefixes or namespaces that could be confused by an unvalidated request routing logic.
The operational impact of this vulnerability allows a remote attacker to potentially redirect application requests, leading to data exfiltration, unauthorized modification of stored datasets, or the injection of malicious content into systems relying on Netezza for analytics and reporting. By exploiting misconfigurations such as overly permissive bucket policies or predictable naming conventions, an adversary can achieve unintended access to sensitive information processed by IBM Netezza. This scenario maps directly to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1530, which covers Data from Cloud Storage Objects, indicating that the attacker is leveraging cloud storage mechanisms to gather intelligence or compromise data integrity without direct intrusion into the core database engine itself.
Mitigation strategies must focus on immediate configuration hardening and architectural adjustments. Administrators should ensure that all S3 buckets integrated with IBM Netezza enforce strict bucket policies that deny access unless explicitly authorized, thereby reducing the attack surface even if the application fails to send ownership checks. It is imperative to upgrade to a patched version of IBM Netezza Software where this validation logic has been corrected. Furthermore, organizations should implement AWS CloudTrail monitoring to detect anomalous S3 API calls originating from Netezza instances and consider using IAM roles with least-privilege principles to limit the scope of actions that can be performed on external storage resources until the software patch is applied.