CVE-2026-85651 in Trigger.dev
Summary
by MITRE • 09/04/2026
Trigger.dev versions before 4.5.2 fail to validate environment membership during run replay operations, allowing authenticated attackers to inject task runs into arbitrary environments. Attackers can replay their own runs into other organizations' or projects' environments to consume victim resources and pollute run history.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/04/2026
The vulnerability identified in Trigger.dev versions prior to 4.5.2 represents a critical failure in access control logic, specifically within the mechanism used for replaying task execution histories. This flaw stems from an insufficient validation of environment membership during the replay operation process. In typical software architecture, particularly in multi-tenant SaaS platforms like Trigger.dev, strict isolation between different organizations and projects is paramount to ensure data integrity and resource security. The system relies on authentication tokens or session identifiers to verify that a user has permission to interact with specific resources. However, in this instance, the backend service responsible for processing replay requests fails to cross-reference the target environment identifier against the authenticated user's actual permissions or organizational boundaries. This oversight creates a direct path for privilege escalation and unauthorized resource manipulation.
From a technical perspective, the core issue lies in the server-side validation logic. When an authenticated attacker initiates a run replay, they provide parameters indicating which task history should be re-executed and into which environment it should be deployed. The application accepts these inputs without verifying that the user associated with the current session is actually a member of the target organization or has explicit write access to the specified project's environment. This lack of object-level authorization check allows an attacker to manipulate input parameters, specifically the environment ID, to point towards resources belonging to other tenants. Because the authentication layer successfully validates the user's identity but fails at the authorization stage regarding resource ownership, the system treats the request as legitimate and proceeds with execution.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant for both individual developers and enterprise organizations utilizing the platform. An authenticated attacker can exploit this flaw to inject task runs into arbitrary environments that they do not own or have permission to access. This capability leads directly to resource exhaustion, as the victim's infrastructure will consume CPU cycles, memory, and network bandwidth executing tasks initiated by an unauthorized party. Furthermore, it results in data pollution within the run history of the target environment. The replayed runs may contain sensitive information from the attacker's context or simply clutter the logs with irrelevant execution records, making debugging and auditing difficult for legitimate administrators. In more severe scenarios, if the replayed tasks involve external API calls or database writes on behalf of the victim organization, it could lead to further security compromises such as data leakage or unauthorized modifications to production systems.
This vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-284, which describes Improper Access Control, specifically highlighting failures in authorization checks that allow users to access resources they should not be able to reach. It also maps to the MITRE ATT&CK framework under techniques related to Resource Hijacking and potentially Initial Access if combined with other vectors, though primarily it is an exploitation of broken object level permissions (BOLA). The attack vector requires authentication, placing it in the category of authenticated attacks rather than unauthenticated remote code execution. However, because many platforms allow users to generate API keys or tokens that can be stored in various contexts, the potential for accidental exposure and subsequent exploitation remains high.
Mitigation strategies must focus on enforcing strict server-side validation at every point where resource identifiers are processed. Developers should implement a robust authorization middleware that explicitly checks if the authenticated user has ownership or specific permissions associated with the target environment ID before allowing any write operations such as run replays. This involves querying the database to verify membership in the organization linked to the environment and ensuring role-based access control (RBAC) policies are correctly applied. Additionally, implementing rate limiting on replay operations can help mitigate the impact of resource exhaustion attacks even if a bypass occurs temporarily. Upgrading to Trigger.dev version 4.5.2 or later is the primary remediation step as it addresses this specific validation gap. For organizations unable to upgrade immediately, network-level controls and strict API gateway policies that validate user-context against target-resource ownership can provide an additional layer of defense until the patch is applied.