CVE-2026-86464 in aeriOS
Summary
by MITRE • 09/08/2026
In the current development version of Eclipse aeriOS, for which no official release has yet been published, the Identity Manager (IdM) deployment included insecure default configurations and credentials for security-sensitive services.
The Helm chart exposed the Keycloak service and its PostgreSQL backing database through Kubernetes NodePort services by default, while the Docker Compose deployment similarly exposed PostgreSQL on all network interfaces. The deployment included fixed default credentials for the Keycloak administrator and PostgreSQL database user, and the previous Helm chart configuration did not provide adequate secret management for these credentials. In addition, predefined application users with known credentials were provided for development and testing without sufficiently warning operators against their use in production environments.
An attacker able to reach the exposed services could use the published default credentials to obtain administrative access to the Identity Manager or direct access to its database. This could allow unauthorized access to or modification of identity-management data, including users, roles, client credentials, sessions, and cryptographic material, and could enable the creation of privileged identities or tokens accepted by other aeriOS components.
The issue has been addressed by generating a random Keycloak administrator password by default, managing Keycloak and PostgreSQL credentials through Kubernetes Secrets, and restricting PostgreSQL to an internal service in both the Helm chart and Docker Compose deployment. OpenLDAP is also restricted to an internal service. The predefined users intended for development and testing are retained, but the documentation now explicitly warns that their default credentials must not be used in production and that these users should be removed or their credentials changed after installation.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/09/2026
The vulnerability identified within the pre-release version of Eclipse aeriOS stems from insecure default configurations embedded in its Identity Manager deployment artifacts, specifically affecting both Helm chart and Docker Compose distributions. This flaw represents a critical failure in secure-by-design principles where sensitive services were exposed to external networks with predictable authentication credentials. The core technical issue involves the improper exposure of backend infrastructure components that handle identity management and data persistence. In the Kubernetes environment facilitated by the Helm chart, the Keycloak service along with its underlying PostgreSQL database was configured as NodePort services by default. This configuration binds these services directly to all available network interfaces on the cluster nodes, effectively bypassing internal network segmentation and making them accessible from any external IP address that can reach the node ports. Similarly, in containerized environments using Docker Compose, the PostgreSQL instance was bound to 0.0.0.0, exposing it to all network interfaces without restriction. This architectural oversight allows unauthorized entities on the same network or potentially over the internet if port forwarding is configured at the host level to interact directly with these services.
The severity of this vulnerability is significantly amplified by the presence of hardcoded default credentials for both the Keycloak administrator account and the PostgreSQL database user. These static passwords were included in the deployment configurations without adequate secret management mechanisms, such as Kubernetes Secrets or environment variable injection from secure vaults. Furthermore, predefined application users with known credentials were provided to facilitate development and testing workflows but lacked sufficient warnings regarding their prohibition in production environments. This combination of exposed services and predictable authentication vectors creates a trivial attack path for malicious actors. An attacker capable of reaching the exposed ports can perform straightforward credential stuffing or brute-force attacks using the published default usernames and passwords. Upon successful authentication, the attacker gains administrative access to the Identity Manager system and direct read-write access to the underlying database containing sensitive identity data.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to the central role of the Identity Manager in aeriOS architecture. Compromise of these services allows an adversary to manipulate critical security artifacts including user profiles, role assignments, client credentials, active sessions, and cryptographic keys used for token signing and encryption. With administrative privileges over Keycloak, an attacker can create new privileged identities or generate valid authentication tokens that are accepted by other components within the aeriOS ecosystem. This effectively grants the attacker full control over the identity layer, enabling lateral movement across the platform. The ability to modify client credentials allows the creation of malicious OAuth2 clients that can impersonate legitimate services, while access to cryptographic material could potentially allow for the forgery of security tokens or decryption of sensitive data stored in session states. This scenario aligns with CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials and CWE-284: Improper Access Control, as well as MITRE ATT&CK techniques related to Initial Access via Valid Accounts and Credential Access through Unsecured Credentials.
The remediation strategy implemented addresses these flaws by enforcing strict default security postures in subsequent updates. The deployment mechanisms now generate random, high-entropy passwords for the Keycloak administrator account upon initialization, eliminating the risk associated with static defaults. Authentication credentials for both Keycloak and PostgreSQL are managed securely through Kubernetes Secrets or equivalent secure configuration methods, ensuring that sensitive data is not hardcoded into container images or chart templates. Network exposure has been mitigated by restricting access to internal-only services; PostgreSQL and OpenLDAP are no longer exposed via NodePort or bound to external interfaces in the Docker Compose setup. These changes ensure that database traffic remains confined within the cluster's private network, requiring proper authentication through service accounts rather than direct port access.
While the predefined users intended for development and testing remain available to support ongoing workflow requirements, their usage is now strictly governed by explicit documentation warnings. Operators are instructed not to use these default credentials in production environments and must either remove these test users or rotate their passwords immediately after installation. This approach balances developer convenience with security hygiene by maintaining utility while enforcing operational discipline. The fix underscores the importance of separating development configurations from production-ready defaults, ensuring that ease of deployment does not come at the expense of fundamental security controls. By aligning the default state with industry best practices for secret management and network segmentation, Eclipse aeriOS reduces its attack surface significantly and prevents unauthorized access to critical identity infrastructure components.