CVE-2026-8810 in H2O
Summary
by MITRE • 08/19/2026
On ARM platforms, a vulnerability in the architecture design of HDD Password could allow an attacker to retrieve HDD Password from UEFI variables.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/19/2026
The identified vulnerability stems from a fundamental architectural flaw within the implementation of Hard Disk Drive (HDD) password protection mechanisms on Advanced RISC Machine architectures when operating under Unified Extensible Firmware Interface environments. This design weakness permits unauthorized actors to extract sensitive authentication credentials, specifically the HDD passwords, directly from UEFI variables stored in non-volatile memory or firmware flash storage. The core issue lies not necessarily in a software bug per se, but in how the security boundaries are enforced between the system management mode and user-space applications during the retrieval process of these critical configuration parameters.
In typical secure configurations, HDD passwords should be hashed using strong cryptographic algorithms before being stored within UEFI variables to prevent direct exposure of plaintext credentials. However, due to this architectural oversight, certain implementations may store or allow access to the password in a format that is susceptible to extraction by malicious software with sufficient privileges. This could include ring-0 level malware, compromised operating system kernels, or attackers who have achieved physical access and can manipulate firmware settings through bootable media. The vulnerability effectively undermines one of the primary layers of data-at-rest protection provided by hardware-level disk encryption features integrated into modern storage devices.
The operational impact of this flaw is severe for organizations relying on HDD passwords as a critical component of their defense-in-depth strategy. If an attacker successfully retrieves these credentials, they can bypass physical security controls intended to prevent unauthorized access to the device's contents. This leads directly to potential data breaches involving sensitive intellectual property, personally identifiable information, and regulated corporate data. Furthermore, because UEFI variables are often accessible during early boot stages or through specific diagnostic tools, the window of opportunity for exploitation is broad. Attackers do not need to compromise the operating system fully; they only require elevated privileges within the firmware environment or access to low-level debugging interfaces that interact with NVRAM contents.
From a classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-312, which describes Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information. It also relates to CWE-940, involving Improper Verification of Cryptographic Binding, if the password retrieval mechanism fails to properly validate that the request originates from an authorized and authenticated context within the firmware hierarchy. In terms of attack vectors, this falls under MITRE ATT&CK technique T1538, which covers Firmware Enumeration, where adversaries gather information about system components including security features like drive locks. Additionally, it may involve T1074, Data Staged, if the extracted passwords are exfiltrated to remote command and control servers for later use in lateral movement or further privilege escalation attacks against connected systems.
Mitigation strategies must focus on both firmware-level hardening and operational policy adjustments. Manufacturers should immediately review their UEFI implementations to ensure that HDD passwords are never stored in plaintext within NVRAM variables. Instead, robust hashing mechanisms with salted keys derived from unique hardware identifiers should be employed. If the current architecture does not support secure storage of these credentials, vendors must provide firmware updates that disable the vulnerable retrieval functions or enforce stricter access controls on UEFI variable sets containing sensitive data. System administrators and security teams should also consider disabling HDD password features if they are managed insecurely by the BIOS/UEFI layer, opting instead for full-disk encryption solutions like BitLocker or FileVault which handle key management more securely at the OS level rather than relying solely on pre-boot hardware locks that may have implementation flaws. Regular audits of firmware integrity and monitoring for unauthorized modifications to UEFI variables can also help detect exploitation attempts early in the kill chain.