CVE-2026-88761 in G980H
Summary
by MITRE • 09/24/2026
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/24/2026
The vulnerability in Botslab G980H dash camera firmware represents a critical failure in cryptographic key management, specifically falling under CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials and CWE-321: Use of a Key Only Once for a Crypto Primitive if the same logic is applied across devices. The core technical flaw lies in the algorithm used to generate default WiFi passwords, which relies on predictable device-specific information rather than cryptographically secure random number generation. This design choice creates a deterministic relationship between visible hardware identifiers and the resulting network credentials. Attackers can exploit this by observing publicly advertised or physically accessible device attributes, such as serial numbers, MAC addresses, or model variants, to narrow down the search space for the remaining password characters significantly.
From an operational perspective, this weakness allows any unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range to perform a targeted brute-force attack with high efficiency. Because portions of the password are known through advertising or physical inspection, the entropy required to crack the remaining segments is drastically reduced compared to a fully random eight-character alphanumeric string. This transforms what should be a computationally infeasible task into a trivial exercise that can often be completed within minutes using standard wireless auditing tools. The impact includes unauthorized access to the device's local network interface, which may expose sensitive video footage stored on the SD card if it is accessible via shared folders or cloud sync mechanisms tied to the local account. Furthermore, gaining control of the dash camera could allow an attacker to manipulate recording schedules, delete evidence, or use the compromised IoT device as a pivot point for further attacks against other devices on the same network segment.
This vulnerability aligns with MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078: Valid Accounts, specifically when applied to default credentials that are easily guessable due to poor implementation of randomness standards like NIST SP 800-90A or RFC 4086 regarding entropy sources. The lack of rate limiting on the authentication mechanism exacerbates the risk, allowing rapid successive login attempts without triggering lockout procedures commonly found in more robust security implementations.
Mitigation strategies must focus on eliminating predictability and enforcing stronger access controls. Manufacturers should replace deterministic password generation with cryptographically secure random number generators that produce high-entropy passwords for each unique device instance. Additionally, implementing account lockout policies after a small number of failed authentication attempts would significantly raise the cost of brute-force attacks. For end-users, immediate remediation involves changing the default WiFi password to a strong, complex passphrase not derived from any visible device information upon initial setup. Network segmentation is also recommended; placing IoT devices like dash cameras on a separate VLAN or guest network isolates them from critical infrastructure and sensitive data stores, limiting the blast radius of a potential compromise. Firmware updates that patch this logic should be prioritized by vendors to address these fundamental security design flaws.