CVE-2026-90451 in Malcolm
Summary
by MITRE • 09/12/2026
An example environment-configuration file ships with a fixed, publicly-known secret value used to sign authentication cookies for a bundled packet-analysis component. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates the value will use the known default, allowing an attacker aware of the default to forge valid authentication cookies for that component.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/12/2026
The vulnerability described constitutes a critical failure in cryptographic key management and secure initialization practices within a network monitoring or packet-analysis application. The core issue lies in the deployment process where an example configuration file containing a hardcoded, static secret is copied directly into the active production environment without executing the necessary setup routine designed to generate unique, random keys for signing authentication cookies. This oversight results in the use of a publicly known default value for cryptographic operations that are intended to ensure data integrity and authenticity. In modern web architectures and network management interfaces, authentication cookies serve as the primary mechanism for maintaining session state and verifying user identity across requests. When these tokens are signed using a secret key that is static and widely documented or easily discoverable through source code analysis, the fundamental security guarantee provided by digital signatures is completely nullified.
From a technical perspective, this flaw represents a classic instance of insecure default configurations where sensitive cryptographic material is not randomized per deployment instance. The attacker does not need to exploit any complex logic errors or buffer overflows; instead, they simply require knowledge of the fixed secret value embedded in the example configuration file. With this key, an adversary can construct valid authentication cookies for arbitrary users or escalate privileges by forging tokens that appear legitimate to the application server. This capability allows unauthorized access to sensitive packet-analysis data, potential manipulation of network traffic logs, and further exploitation within the internal network segment where the component resides. The vulnerability is particularly severe because it affects all deployments that fail to run the initialization script, a common occurrence in automated provisioning pipelines or manual installations where documentation may be overlooked or misunderstood.
This issue aligns directly with CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials and CWE-295: Improper Certificate Validation, as the system fails to validate the uniqueness and secrecy of its authentication secrets during initialization. Furthermore, it maps to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078: Valid Accounts, specifically through the sub-technique of forging or manipulating credentials due to weak cryptographic implementation. The operational impact is significant, potentially leading to full compromise of the packet-analysis component's confidentiality and integrity. Attackers can intercept network traffic details, modify logging data to hide malicious activities, or use the compromised session to pivot into other parts of the infrastructure if the application has broader permissions.
Mitigation strategies must focus on enforcing secure initialization procedures at deployment time. The most effective remediation is to ensure that the setup routine which generates unique, cryptographically strong random keys for cookie signing is mandatory and cannot be bypassed during installation or configuration updates. Developers should implement checks within the application startup sequence to detect if a default key is still in use and either refuse to start or automatically trigger key regeneration with secure storage mechanisms such as environment variables managed by orchestration tools rather than static files. Additionally, implementing short-lived session tokens combined with robust server-side validation can limit the window of opportunity for attackers exploiting forged cookies. Regular security audits should include verification that no example configurations are deployed in production environments and that all cryptographic secrets are unique per instance and rotated periodically according to industry best practices.