CVE-2026-92190 in Foglight for Databases
Summary
by MITRE • 11/04/2026
Quest Foglight for Databases baseRmiServiceExporter Deserialization of Untrusted Data Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of Quest Foglight for Databases. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.
The specific flaw exists within the configuration of the baseRmiServiceExporter bean. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of user-supplied data prior to deserializing it. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of SYSTEM. Was ZDI-CAN-29170.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/04/2026
The identified vulnerability represents a critical security flaw within Quest Foglight for Databases, specifically affecting the baseRmiServiceExporter component. This issue is classified as a deserialization of untrusted data vulnerability, which falls under CWE-502 in the Common Weakness Enumeration framework. The core technical failure lies in the application's handling of Java Remote Method Invocation (RMI) services. When the system receives serialized objects from remote clients, it fails to perform adequate validation or sanitization before attempting to deserialize them into executable code structures. This lack of input verification allows malicious actors to inject crafted payloads that exploit known gadget chains within the Java runtime environment, leading directly to arbitrary code execution on the target host.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to its remote and unauthenticated nature. Attackers do not need valid credentials or prior access to the Foglight management console to initiate an exploitation attempt. By sending a specially crafted RMI request containing malicious serialized data, an adversary can bypass authentication mechanisms entirely. Once exploited, the injected code executes with the privileges of the user account running the Foglight service. In typical enterprise deployments where such services are configured to run under high-privilege accounts like SYSTEM or root, this results in complete system compromise. The attacker gains full control over the underlying operating system, enabling them to install backdoors, exfiltrate sensitive database credentials stored within the management platform, pivot to other network segments, and disrupt critical database monitoring operations.
This vulnerability aligns with MITRE ATT&CK technique T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter through Java, as well as T1203 Executable File Execution if the payload involves compiled binaries or scripts deployed via the initial code execution. The exploitation path typically involves crafting a malicious object that leverages common libraries present in the classpath to trigger arbitrary method calls during deserialization. This is a classic example of insecure default configurations where legacy RMI endpoints are exposed without sufficient security controls such as strict type checking, allow-listing of trusted classes, or disabling dangerous serialization features. The reference ZDI-CAN-29170 indicates that this issue was reported through Zero Day Initiative, highlighting its significance in the broader cybersecurity community and the urgency for remediation given the ease of exploitation by unauthenticated actors.
Mitigation strategies must focus on immediate patching and configuration hardening. Administrators should apply the latest security updates provided by Quest Software to address the flaw within the baseRmiServiceExporter bean logic. Until patches are applied, it is advisable to restrict network access to the RMI ports used by Foglight using firewall rules or Access Control Lists, ensuring that only trusted management stations can communicate with these endpoints. Additionally, disabling unnecessary remote services and enforcing strict authentication requirements where possible can reduce the attack surface. Long-term remediation should involve migrating away from legacy serialization mechanisms toward more secure communication protocols such as HTTPS with mutual TLS authentication, thereby eliminating the risk associated with Java object deserialization attacks entirely.