CVE-2026-93597 in ArcadeDB
Summary
by MITRE • 09/18/2026
ArcadeDB versions before 26.9.1 fail to validate IPv6 transition addresses in the SSRF guard used by IMPORT DATABASE and server commands. Authenticated attackers can supply URLs resolving to NAT64, 6to4, or Teredo addresses embedding RFC 1918 or loopback IPv4 payloads to reach internal services and cloud metadata endpoints.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/18/2026
The vulnerability in ArcadeDB versions prior to 26.9.1 represents a critical failure in input validation within the server-side request forgery (SSRF) protection mechanism, specifically affecting the IMPORT DATABASE functionality and other server commands that accept external URLs as parameters. SSRF vulnerabilities generally arise when an application fetches a resource specified by a user without properly validating whether the destination is internal or untrusted. In this specific instance, the flaw lies in the logic used to parse and validate IPv6 transition addresses. The system fails to correctly identify and block IPv6 formats that are designed to encapsulate IPv4 addresses, such as NAT64, 6to4, and Teredo addressing schemes. These mechanisms allow an attacker to encode private or loopback IPv4 addresses within a valid-looking IPv6 string, thereby bypassing standard SSRF guards that typically check for private IP ranges like RFC 1918 space (e.g., 10.x.x.x, 172.16-31.x.x, 192.168.x.x) or the loopback address 127.0.0.1.
From a technical perspective, the core issue is that the validation logic does not perform deep inspection of the encapsulated payload within these transition addresses. When an authenticated user supplies a URL containing such an IPv6 address, the server resolves it and attempts to connect to the embedded destination. Because the outer layer appears as a public or valid IPv6 address, the initial checks pass. However, upon resolution or connection establishment, the traffic is directed toward internal network resources that should be inaccessible from external interfaces. This allows authenticated attackers to interact with services running on localhost, such as database administration panels, monitoring tools, or configuration endpoints, which are typically shielded by firewall rules restricting access to loopback interfaces only.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to the potential for unauthorized data exfiltration and lateral movement within a network environment. By leveraging this flaw, an attacker can probe internal services that may contain sensitive business logic or proprietary data not intended for public exposure. Furthermore, cloud metadata endpoints are frequently targeted in SSRF attacks because they often provide temporary credentials, IAM roles, and configuration details to running instances. If the affected ArcadeDB instance is deployed within a cloud infrastructure such as AWS EC2, Azure VMs, or Google Cloud Compute Engine, an attacker could retrieve these metadata tokens. Possession of these tokens can lead to full compromise of the underlying virtual machine and potentially escalate privileges across other resources in the same account or project through identity federation mechanisms.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-918, which describes Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) flaws where the server makes requests from a back-end system using user-supplied input without sufficient validation of the destination address. Additionally, it maps to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1504.003, specifically Web Session Hijacking or Cloud Infrastructure Discovery via SSRF, as attackers use these forged requests to discover and interact with internal cloud metadata services. The lack of strict enforcement against IPv6 transition addresses highlights a common oversight in security controls that focus primarily on traditional IPv4 private ranges while neglecting the complexities of modern networking protocols.
To mitigate this risk, organizations running ArcadeDB versions before 26.9.1 must upgrade to version 26.9.1 or later immediately, as these newer releases include corrected validation logic capable of detecting and blocking encapsulated private addresses within IPv6 transition formats. For environments where an immediate upgrade is not feasible, network-level controls should be implemented to restrict outbound connections from the database server. This includes configuring firewalls to block all egress traffic except for explicitly whitelisted external domains or IP ranges. Additionally, implementing a reverse proxy with strict URL validation can serve as an additional layer of defense by sanitizing inputs before they reach the application backend. Regular security audits and penetration testing focused on SSRF vectors are recommended to ensure that similar gaps in input validation do not exist elsewhere in the system architecture.