CVE-2026-94598 in NukeViet
Summary
by MITRE • 11/20/2026
NukeViet CMS is a multi Content Management System. From 4.5.08 until 4.5.12 and 4.6.02, an attacker can place NukeViet's internal {@[, ]@}, [@{, and }@] sanitizer markers in an iframe srcdoc value by encoding square brackets as HTML entities. Recursive NukeViet\Core\Request::filterTags() processing decodes the characters, accepts the forged marker, and later converts it to real markup without normal tag or attribute filtering. Because an unsandboxed srcdoc iframe shares the parent origin and iframe is enabled by default through NV_ALLOWED_HTML_TAGS, stored Contact messages, comments with the editor enabled, or submitted articles can execute JavaScript with the viewer's session. This issue is fixed in versions 4.5.12 and 4.6.02.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/20/2026
The vulnerability identified in NukeViet CMS versions ranging from 4.5.08 through 4.5.12, as well as version 4.6.02, represents a critical stored cross-site scripting flaw rooted in the application's input sanitization logic. The core of this issue lies within the recursive processing mechanism implemented by the NukeViet\Core\Request::filterTags() function. This function is designed to strip or neutralize potentially dangerous HTML tags and attributes from user-supplied data before it is rendered in a web browser. However, the implementation fails to adequately handle encoded variations of specific internal sanitizer markers, namely {[, ]}, [{, and }]. These markers are intended by the CMS developers to signal parts of content that should be ignored or processed differently during rendering. The flaw occurs because an attacker can encode square brackets as HTML entities within these marker structures, effectively bypassing the initial detection logic which relies on literal character matching rather than a comprehensive decoding-and-validation approach.
When user input containing these encoded markers is submitted through features such as stored contact messages, comments with the editor enabled, or submitted articles, the data is initially accepted by the application's request handling layer. The recursive filterTags() function processes this input and, due to the encoding bypass, decodes the HTML entities back into their literal square bracket forms. Consequently, the forged sanitizer markers are recognized as valid internal directives rather than malicious payload indicators. In subsequent rendering stages, these markers are converted into real markup without undergoing further normal tag or attribute filtering. This lack of secondary validation allows arbitrary JavaScript code to be injected directly into the DOM structure when the content is viewed by other users.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to the specific context in which it operates. The malicious script is executed within an iframe using the srcdoc attribute, a feature that shares the same origin as the parent document by default unless explicitly sandboxed with restrictive attributes such as allow-scripts being omitted or set to false. Since NukeViet CMS has this iframe capability enabled by default through the NV_ALLOWED_HTML_TAGS configuration setting, and because there is no effective sandboxing applied in vulnerable versions, any user viewing the compromised content will execute the attacker's JavaScript within their own session context. This allows for a wide range of malicious activities including session hijacking, credential theft via keylogging or form grabbing, defacement of the website interface, or redirection to phishing sites. The persistence of this payload makes it particularly dangerous as every visitor who loads the affected page becomes a potential victim without any immediate interaction required beyond viewing the content.
From an industry standard perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation commonly known as Cross-site Scripting (XSS). Specifically, it falls under stored XSS where malicious scripts are permanently stored within target servers such as in a database or comment field. The attack vector also relates to ATT&CK technique T1059.007: JavaScript, which describes the use of client-side scripting languages for execution on victim systems. Furthermore, the failure to properly decode and validate input before processing reflects CWE-20: Improper Input Validation, where the application fails to normalize or canonicalize special characters that could alter the intended interpretation of the data by downstream components.
Mitigation strategies must focus on both immediate patching and long-term architectural improvements. The primary remediation is to upgrade NukeViet CMS to version 4.5.13 or later, as well as any versions beyond 4.6.02 where this specific filtering logic has been corrected. For organizations unable to immediately apply patches, a temporary workaround involves modifying the NV_ALLOWED_HTML_TAGS configuration to disable iframe srcdoc functionality if it is not strictly required for business operations. Additionally, implementing Content Security Policy headers can help mitigate the impact by restricting the sources from which scripts are allowed to execute, although this does not fix the underlying vulnerability. Future development should prioritize adopting a whitelist-based approach for HTML sanitization and ensuring that all input decoding occurs before validation checks rather than after, thereby preventing encoded bypasses of security filters.