CVE-2026-95824 in Zephyrinfo

Summary

by MITRE • 11/20/2026

The IPv6 Neighbor Discovery code in subsys/net/ip/ipv6_nbr.c flushes a neighbour's queued packets at the end of handle_ra_input(). The Source Link-Layer Address Option (SLLAO) is optional in a Router Advertisement; when it is absent, handle_ra_input() still obtains (or creates) a neighbour cache entry for the RA source via net_ipv6_nbr_add() with a NULL link-layer address, so the entry stays in NET_IPV6_NBR_STATE_INCOMPLETE with nbr->idx == NET_NBR_LLADDR_UNKNOWN. The pending-packet drain loop was entered unconditionally for that unresolved entry.

Each net_send_data() in the drain loop runs synchronously into net_ipv6_prepare_for_send(), which finds the neighbour still unresolved and hands the packet to net_ipv6_send_ns(), which puts it straight back onto the same pending_queue. The loop therefore never sees an empty queue. With a single queued packet it transmits a fresh Neighbor Solicitation on every iteration; with two or more queued packets it rotates the queue with no allocation and no transmission at all. The loop runs in the network RX thread with the global IPv6 neighbour mutex held.

An unauthenticated attacker on the same link can trigger this deterministically: advertise itself as a router, induce the victim to queue off-link traffic toward that router (for example by sending echo requests with an off-link source address) while leaving the solicitation unanswered, then send a second Router Advertisement without an SLLAO option. Spoofing an SLLAO-less RA from the legitimate router's link-local address has the same effect whenever traffic is queued for it. Router Advertisements are processed with no authentication whenever CONFIG_NET_IPV6_ND is enabled, which is the default for IPv6-capable builds.

The result is a permanent denial of service: the RX thread spins forever holding the neighbour lock, so all IPv6 transmission and every other user of the neighbour cache blocks, and the Neighbor Advertisement that would resolve the entry can no longer be processed. The ipv6_ns_reply_timer work item that would normally drop the pending packets also blocks on the same mutex. In the single-packet variant the loop additionally floods the link with Neighbor Solicitations. The fix restricts the flush to resolved entries (nbr->idx != NET_NBR_LLADDR_UNKNOWN), leaving the packets queued for the NS reply timeout. There is no memory-safety impact.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 11/20/2026

The vulnerability resides within the IPv6 Neighbor Discovery implementation in Zephyr OS, specifically affecting the handling of Router Advertisements and neighbor cache resolution logic found in subsys/net/ip/ipv6_nbr.c. The core technical flaw occurs during the processing of incoming Router Advertisement packets via the handle_ra_input function. When a device receives a Router Advertisement that lacks a Source Link-Layer Address Option, which is technically optional per RFC standards, the system still creates or updates an entry in the neighbor cache using net_ipv6_nbr_add with a NULL link-layer address. This results in the neighbor state being set to NET_IPV6_NBR_STATE_INCOMPLETE and the internal index marker nbr->idx remaining at NET_NBR_LLADDR_UNKNOWN, indicating that the layer-two address is unresolved. The critical failure point arises because the code unconditionally initiates a drain loop for pending packets associated with this specific neighbor entry without verifying whether the link-layer address has been successfully resolved.

This unconditional processing triggers an infinite execution loop within the network receive thread context while holding the global IPv6 neighbor mutex, creating a severe resource exhaustion condition that constitutes a permanent denial of service. The operational mechanics involve net_send_data being called synchronously for each packet in the pending queue. Because the neighbor remains unresolved, net_ipv6_prepare_for_send redirects these packets to net_ipv6_send_ns, which immediately re-queues them back onto the same pending_queue rather than transmitting them or dropping them appropriately. In scenarios where only a single packet is queued, this loop results in the continuous transmission of fresh Neighbor Solicitation messages on every iteration, leading to network flooding and excessive bandwidth consumption. Conversely, if two or more packets are present, the queue rotation occurs without any allocation or actual transmission, yet the loop condition remains true indefinitely because the queue never empties. This spinlock behavior effectively freezes all IPv6 transmissions across the system since the global mutex is held continuously, blocking other network operations and preventing the processing of legitimate Neighbor Advertisements that might otherwise resolve the entry.

From an attacker perspective, this vulnerability allows for a deterministic denial-of-service attack by any unauthenticated host on the same local link segment. An adversary can exploit this by first advertising itself as a router to induce traffic flow toward it, such as by sending echo requests with off-link source addresses that require routing through the target device. By ensuring that subsequent Neighbor Solicitations remain unanswered and then transmitting a second Router Advertisement devoid of the Source Link-Layer Address Option, the attacker forces the victim into this infinite loop state. This attack vector is particularly dangerous because it leverages the default configuration where CONFIG_NET_IPV6_ND is enabled for IPv6-capable builds, meaning no special authentication mechanisms are in place to validate the legitimacy or completeness of Router Advertisement messages before processing them. The impact extends beyond simple service interruption; by holding the neighbor mutex indefinitely, the system also blocks the ipv6_ns_reply_timer work item, which normally handles timeout-based cleanup of pending packets, thereby compounding the persistence of the denial-of-service condition until a manual reboot occurs.

This incident maps directly to CWE-835, specifically Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition, as the code logic fails to account for the state where link-layer resolution is impossible or delayed indefinitely. Furthermore, it aligns with MITRE ATT&CK technique T1499, Endpoint Denial of Service, due to its ability to exhaust system resources and render network functionality unavailable through a simple protocol manipulation rather than complex exploitation chains. The absence of authentication for Router Advertisements further highlights weaknesses in the implementation's adherence to secure-by-default principles regarding neighbor discovery protocols. To mitigate this vulnerability, the recommended fix restricts the packet flush operation exclusively to neighbors that have been fully resolved, identified by checking if nbr->idx is not equal to NET_NBR_LLADDR_UNKNOWN. This ensures that pending packets for unresolved entries are left in their queue to be handled correctly by standard timeout mechanisms rather than triggering an infinite processing loop. While this issue does not present memory-safety risks such as buffer overflows or use-after-free conditions, its impact on system availability is critical and requires immediate patching of the neighbor discovery logic to validate link-layer address resolution status before attempting packet drainage operations.

Responsible

Zephyr

Reservation

09/22/2026

Disclosure

11/20/2026

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00460

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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