CVE-2026-99432 in Linuxinfo

Summary

by MITRE • 11/19/2026

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ocfs2/dlm: hold the lookup reference across convert AST enqueue

dlm_convert_lock_handler() drops the reference it took when it found the lock on res->granted at its leave label, one statement before it calls dlm_queue_ast(). dlm_free_dead_locks() takes res->spinlock and drops the list and base references, so a peer death landing in that gap leaves the handler's own put as the one that frees the lock, and __dlm_queue_ast() then reads lock->lockres from freed memory.

The handler is registered next to dlm_create_lock_handler(), so a convert message buffered on a dying peer's socket arrives on the same o2net receive work that o2net_disconnect_node() does not wait for. The two can interleave as follows, with the reference counts as they are before this fix:

Socket data-ready Node-down thread Receive worker ----------------- ---------------- -------------- o2net_data_ready() select sc under callback read lock o2net_disconnect_node() queue shutdown begin flush; new color queue sc_rx_work in the new color release callback lock shutdown socket flush returns read buffered convert_lock dlm_convert_lock_handler() find lock on res->granted dlm_lock_get() refs = 3 lock res->spinlock __dlmconvert_master() call_ast = 1 unlock res->spinlock DLM node-down cleanup lock res->spinlock dlm_free_dead_locks() unlink lock put list ref refs = 2 put base ref refs = 1 unlock res->spinlock dlm_lock_put() refs = 0 free lock dlm_queue_ast() __dlm_queue_ast() read lock->lockres (use-after-free)

__dlmconvert_master() only moves the lock between lists, so the count entering the gap is base, list and lookup. Drop the lookup reference after the AST is queued instead of before it and the race ends with the one __dlm_queue_ast() took, which dlm_flush_asts() releases later with ast_pending cleared and ast_list unlinked. No extra get is needed, and the normal case ends with the same count as before.

dlmconvert_master() has the same shape but is only reached from dlmlock() for a lock this node owns, which dlm_free_dead_locks() never matches.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 11/19/2026

The Linux kernel's Distributed Lock Manager within the OCFS2 filesystem contains a critical use-after-free vulnerability located in the lock conversion handler logic. This flaw arises from an improper reference counting sequence during the processing of distributed lock requests, specifically when handling convert messages for locks held by remote nodes that subsequently become unreachable or die. The core issue is situated within the dlm_convert_lock_handler function, which manages the lifecycle of lock resources as they transition between different states in the cluster-wide locking protocol. Under normal operation, this handler acquires references to ensure the lock resource remains valid while processing occurs. However, a specific race condition exists where these references are released prematurely relative to asynchronous operations that depend on them remaining alive.

The technical flaw manifests when dlm_convert_lock_handler locates an existing lock in the granted list and proceeds to process it. The function temporarily increments reference counts for base, list, and lookup purposes before calling internal conversion logic. Crucially, prior to this fix, the handler would drop its own lookup reference immediately after determining that a convert action is required but before queuing the asynchronous completion signal known as an AST (Asynchronous Signal Target). This creates a narrow time window where the local node's hold on the lock resource is reduced while other cluster processes may still be interacting with it. Specifically, if a peer node fails or disconnects during this interval, the cleanup routine dlm_free_dead_locks acquires the spinlock associated with the lock resource and proceeds to unlink the lock from internal lists and decrement its base reference count.

This sequence of events leads directly to a use-after-free condition because the local handler's subsequent call to release its remaining references triggers the actual deallocation of the lock structure in memory. Immediately following this deallocation, dlm_convert_lock_handler invokes __dlm_queue_ast() to notify interested parties about the completion of the operation. The function __dlm_queue_ast attempts to access members of the now-freed lock object, specifically reading from lock->lockres. Since the underlying memory has already been returned to the allocator and potentially reused for other purposes, this read constitutes a use-after-free vulnerability. Such an error can lead to kernel panics, data corruption, or in worst-case scenarios, arbitrary code execution if an attacker can control the contents of the reclaimed memory region through carefully crafted network packets that trigger the race condition.

The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant for high-availability clusters relying on OCFS2 and its distributed locking mechanisms. The interleaving of socket data processing and node disconnection events allows external triggers to exploit the timing gap. An attacker with the ability to inject malformed or specifically timed network packets could induce a denial-of-service by crashing the kernel, thereby disrupting all services dependent on that cluster node. Furthermore, if the memory reuse patterns allow for controlled content in the freed region, there is potential for privilege escalation from user space to root level within the compromised host. This aligns with CWE-416, which describes use-after-free errors resulting from improper management of object lifecycles and reference counts.

Mitigation strategies primarily involve applying kernel patches that correct the reference counting logic in dlm_convert_lock_handler. The fix ensures that the lookup reference is held until after __dlm_queue_ast() has safely queued the completion signal, thereby guaranteeing that the lock resource remains valid throughout the entire asynchronous notification process. This adjustment prevents the premature deallocation of the lock structure and eliminates the race window with node cleanup routines. Administrators should ensure their systems are updated to include this patch, particularly if they operate OCFS2 clusters where network instability or frequent node joins and leaves occur. Additionally, monitoring for kernel oops messages related to dlm subsystems can help identify instances where the vulnerability might have been triggered before a fix is applied. From an offensive security perspective, this scenario exemplifies timing-based exploitation vectors often categorized under ATT&CK techniques involving resource manipulation and memory corruption, highlighting the importance of rigorous synchronization in distributed systems programming.

Responsible

Linux

Reservation

09/25/2026

Disclosure

11/19/2026

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00176

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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