CVE-2026-99453 in Linuxinfo

Summary

by MITRE • 11/19/2026

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

xen-blkfront: unbind irq before tearing down ring and shadow requests

In blkif_free_ring(), the driver tears down the ring's persistent grants, shadow request arrays, and shared ring structure (xenbus_teardown_ring), and only calls unbind_from_irqhandler() at the very end.

While blkif_free_ring() is freeing persistent grants and clearing the shadow array, the event channel interrupt (blkif_interrupt) is still registered and active. If an interrupt arrives from the backend during this teardown window, blkif_interrupt() reads rinfo->ring.sring and, via blkif_completion(), accesses rinfo->shadow[id].grants_used and
rinfo->shadow[id].sg. blkif_free_ring() tears these structures down
without holding rinfo->ring_lock, and the handler only checks info->connected at entry, so this is a real race resulting in a use-after-free or NULL pointer dereference.

Fix this by moving unbind_from_irqhandler() to the beginning of blkif_free_ring(). Calling unbind_from_irqhandler() first frees the IRQ and synchronizes with any in-flight interrupt handlers on other CPUs before ring memory and shadow request structures are deallocated, matching the teardown order in drivers/net/xen-netfront.c.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 11/19/2026

The vulnerability identified within the Linux kernel's xen-blkfront driver represents a critical race condition occurring during the device teardown sequence, specifically within the blkif_free_ring function. This flaw arises from an incorrect ordering of resource deallocation relative to interrupt handler unbinding. In the affected implementation, the driver proceeds to tear down the persistent grants, shadow request arrays, and shared ring structure via xenbus_teardown_ring before invoking unbind_from_irqhandler. Consequently, during this intermediate window where memory structures are being freed or cleared, the event channel interrupt associated with blkif_interrupt remains registered and active in the kernel's interrupt subsystem. This creates a dangerous state where hardware events can still trigger execution paths that rely on resources currently undergoing destruction.

The operational impact of this race condition is severe, potentially leading to system instability or denial of service through kernel panic. If an interrupt arrives from the Xen backend while the teardown process is underway, the blkif_interrupt handler executes and attempts to access critical data structures such as rinfo->ring.sring. Through the blkif_completion routine, it further accesses fields within the shadow request array, specifically rinfo->shadow[id].grants_used and rinfo->shadow[id].sg. Because these memory regions are being deallocated without holding the necessary synchronization lock, rinfo->ring_lock, there is no guarantee that the data remains valid or intact. The interrupt handler only performs a superficial check on info->connected at entry, which does not prevent access to freed memory if the teardown has already begun but not yet completed. This results in either a use-after-free vulnerability, where stale pointers are dereferenced against corrupted or reclaimed memory, or a NULL pointer dereference if the structures have been zeroed out or unmapped entirely.

From a classification perspective, this issue aligns with CWE-416, Use After Free, as the code accesses memory after it has been made available for reallocation without proper synchronization to prevent concurrent access. It also relates to CWE-362, Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization, because the race condition is triggered by the lack of locking during the critical section where shared resources are being modified and freed while an asynchronous interrupt handler may concurrently access them. In terms of adversary behavior mapping under MITRE ATT&CK, this vulnerability could be leveraged for privilege escalation or denial of service if exploited in a virtualized environment to crash the host kernel or disrupt block storage operations, falling under techniques such as System Process Disruption or potentially influencing availability impacts within cloud infrastructure contexts.

The resolution involves reordering the teardown sequence by moving the call to unbind_from_irqhandler() to the very beginning of blkif_free_ring(). This change ensures that the interrupt line is disabled and any in-flight interrupt handlers on other CPUs are synchronized with before any ring memory or shadow request structures are deallocated. By freeing the IRQ first, the driver eliminates the possibility of new interrupts arriving during the critical teardown phase, thereby preventing concurrent access to resources that are no longer valid. This approach mirrors the established safe pattern used in drivers/net/xen-netfront.c, ensuring consistency across Xen frontend drivers and adhering to best practices for resource management in asynchronous environments where hardware events can occur unpredictably relative to software state changes.

Responsible

Linux

Reservation

09/25/2026

Disclosure

11/19/2026

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00176

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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